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THE AUTHORITY OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION TO
ORDER CORRECTIVE ADVERTISING
For years, Listerine Antiseptic, a mouthwash product, had been ad-
vertised as an effective ingredient in the prevention and cure of colds and
sore throats.' In 1972, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) challenged
these representations by issuing a complaint 2 against Listerine's producer,
the Warner-Lambert Co. (Warner-Lambert). The complaint alleged that,
contrary to its advertisements,' Listerine does not cure or prevent colds or
sore throats or cause them to be less severe than they otherwise would be. 4
' Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct.
1575 (1978). Warner-Lambert has marketed Listerine since 1879, always representing the
product as an effective ingredient in the treatment of colds and sore throats. Starting in 1921,
these claims were directly advertised to the consumer. Id.
2
 Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398-1404 0975), [1970-1973 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 1 19,838, 20,045 (complaint proposed November 3, 1971 and
issued June 27, 1972). The Commission is empowered to issue a complaint whenever it has
"reason to believe" that an unlawful practice is being employed and that an administrative
proceeding would be "to the interest of the public." Federal Trade Commission Act, 5, 15
U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970). This is the formal opening of an adjudicative proceeding before the
Commission. See Procedures & Rules of Practice for the Federal Trade Commission, 16 C.F.R.
§ 3.11 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FTC Rules). However, in the majority of cases, alleged of-
fenders are given the opportunity to settle the case by negotiating with the Commission for a
cease and desist order. Under this Consent Order Procedure, the respondent is bound by the
agreed upon cease and desist order as if there had been a formal order entered after trial and
review. Only when there is no agreement at this stage does the Commission issue its formal
complaint. See FTC Rules, 16 C.F.R. 2.31-.34 (1977).
The cold and sore throat claims were made on labels, print advertisements and televi-
sion commercials. Representative advertisements are as follows:
On packages or labels:
LISTERINE
Antiseptic
Kills Germs
By Millions
On Contact
For Bad Breath, Colds and
Resultant Sore Throats
***************************************************************************************
For Colds and Resultant Sore Throats-Gargle with Listerine Antiseptic Full Strength
at the First Sign of your Cold.
In print advertisements:
FIGHT BACK—The colds-catching season is here again! Nothing can cold-proof
you***but Listerine Antiseptic gives you a chance to fight back!
***************************************************************************************
Fight back with Listerine Antiseptic. Gargle twice a day—starting now—before
you get a cold. You may find the colds you do get will be milder, less severe.
That's why more people use Listerine during the colds-catching season than any
other oral antiseptic. Why don't you?
86 F.T.C. at 1399-1400, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder) TRADE REG, REP, (CCH) . 1 19,838, at
21,859.
4 1d. at 1400-01, [1970.1973 Transfer Binder) TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 19,838, at
21,859. The complaint also alleged that Warner-Lambert falsely represented that the latest
tests prove that children who gargle with Listerine have fewer colds and miss fewer days of
school because of colds than children who do not use Listerine. This allegation was dismissed
by the FTC. 86 F.T.C. 1515 (1975). The complaint also alleged that the statement, "Kills
Germs by Millions on Contact," gives the erroneous impression that such germ-killing ability is
of medical significance in the treatment of colds and sore throats. Id. at 1401, [1970-1973
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG: REP. (CCH) 1 19,838, at 21,859-60.
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The complaint charged that these "false, misleading and deceptive" state-
ments were in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Acts
Extensive evidentiary hearings were held before an administrative law
judge who sustained the allegations of the complaint.° Upon appeal? by
Warner-Lambert to the FTC, this decision was affirmed.° Accepting the
findings made below, the FTC ordered the company to cease and desist the
challenged cold and sore throat representations.° The Commission further
prohibited any future Listerine advertisement unless accompanied by a
clear and conspicuous statement that:
Contrary to prior advertising, Listerine will not help prevent
colds or sore throats or lessen their severity.'°
The corrective statement was required until Warner-Lambert had spent a
sum equal to the average annual Listerine advertising budget for the
period of April 1962 to March 1972."
Warner-Lambert appealecl 12 and in Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, ' 3 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit af-
firmed the order; with modification.' 4 The court held first, that the FTC
has the authority to issue a corrective advertising order in appropriate
cases, even though such a remedy is not expressly mentioned in the Com-
mission's authorizing statute," and second, that the corrective advertising
order as modified was appropriate in this case because it was reasonably re-
lated to the goal of dissipating the lingering effects of Warner-Lambert's
prior false and deceptive advertisements."
As a preliminary matter, the court observed that there was "substan-
tial evidence on the record viewed as a whole'" 7 to support the Commis-
Section 5 of the Act provides than "Unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared
unlawful." 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
6 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1405-86 (1975) (initial decision by Alvin L. Berman, Administrative
Law Judge, November 25,1974). The evidentiary hearings are public hearings after which the
administrative law judge makes findings of fact and proposes an initial order. See FTC Rules,
16 C.F.R. § 3.41-.51 (1977). The hearings in Warner-Lambert extended over four months.
There were approximately 4,000 pages of documentary exhibits and forty-six witnesses.
Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d at 752.
7 The decision of the administrative law judge may be appealed by either party to the
full Commission within thirty days. See FTC Rules, 16 C.F.R. § 3.52-.55 (1977).
86 F.T.C. 1398, 1513-15 (1975).
t' Id. at 1513-14.
"Id. at 1514.
"Id. at 1515. This is a sum of approximately $10 million. 562 F.2d at 752 n.l. The
final order also included notice terms so that the corrective message would be readily appar-
ent in both print and television advertisements. 86 F.T.C. at 1514. See note 236 infra.
12 A respondent can obtain judicial review of a final cease and desist order in a United
States Court of Appeals by filing a written petition within 60 days. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970).
" 526 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1575 (1978). Judge Wright filed
the opinion for himself and Judge Bazelon. Judge Robb dissented. 562 F.2d at 752.
14 Id. On review, the court of appeals can affirm, enforce, modify or set aside the final
order of the FTC. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970). In Warner-Lambert, the court found that the
preamble "Contrary to prior advertising" was not necessary to the effectiveness of the correc-
tive message. See text at notes 235-48 infra.
" 562 F.2d at 756-57.
16 1d. at 762.
" Id. at 753. When the court of appeals reviews an order, "[Ohe findings of the Com-
mission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive." 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970).
Such a statutory provision uniformly has been held to require that the agency's decision be
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sion's finding that Listerine is not beneficial for colds or sore throats. In
particular it accepted the Commission's findings of fact which were based
upon the evidence produced at the hearings below." The court further
concluded that the Commission did not err in refusing to reopen the pro-
ceedings to consider a later Food and Drug Administration study of over-
the-counter cold remedies, determining that the FDA study did not fun-
damentally contradict the Commission's findings." More importantly, how-
ever, the court 'gave credence to the Commission's findings that Warner-
Lambert's false and deceptive advertisements had engendered erroneous
beliefs in the minds of consumers, namely, that Listerine will prevent or
cure colds and sore throats. 20 Moreover, it appeared that these beliefs
would remain even after Warner-Lambert had stopped the offensive Lis-
terine advertisements" and would continue to be a significant factor in fu-
ture consumer purchasing decisions." Accordingly, the court accepted the
Commission's view of the evidence that the "deceptive advertisements have
created false beliefs which are likely to continue to exist and influence con-
sumer decisions to purchase Listerine."23
Judge Wright's opinion for the. majority next utilized a two-step pro-
cess to support the holding that the Commission has the authority to re-
quire corrective advertising. First, the court construed precedent concern-
ing the agency's remedial authority in the antitrust area to conclude that
"the Commission has the power to shape remedies which go beyond the
simple cease and desist order,"" the only remedy for which the Federal
Trade Commission Act expressly provides." Second, the court determined
that corrective advertising is not outside the range of permissible affirma-
tive remedies to which the Commission may look." in support of this latter
view, the majority observed that nothing in the legislative history of the
FTC Act proscribed the use of corrective advertising." Specifically, the
court ruled that a 1975 amendment to the Act, 28 giving to the courts the
supported by substantial evidence on the record viewed as a whole. See Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 493 (1951).
18 562 F.2d at 753-54.
19 /d. at 754-56.
"Id. at 762-63. Based on expert testimony and consumer survey evidence, the Commis-
sion had found that a substantial number of consumers held erroneous beliefs concerning Lis-
terine's ability to alleviate colds and sore throats and that these beliefs were created and main-
tained by Warner-Lambert's deceptive advertising. 86 F.T.C. at 1501-03, [1973-1976 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. FUR (CCH) 1 21,066, at 20,935-37.
21
 562 F,2d at 762-63 & n.65. The Commission had concluded that a substantial portion
of consumers would retain the erroneous beliefs about Listerine's cold and sore throat efficacy
well into the 1980's. 86 F.T.C. at 1503-04, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 1 21,066, at 20,937.
22 562 F.2d at 762-63 & n.65. See 86 F.T.C. at 1504, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. Rat'. (CCH) 1 21,066, at 20,937.
23
 562 F.2d at 769 (supplemental opinion on petition for rehearing).
" 562 F.2d at 757.
" lf, after reviewing the evidence at a hearing, the Commission determines that the re-
spondent has engaged in an unfair or deceptive business practice, the Commission is empow-
ered to issue an order requiring such person, partnership, or corporation to cease and desist
from using such method of competition or such act or practice." FTC Act. § 5, 15 U.S.G.
§ 45(b) (1970).
28 562 F.2d at 757-62.
27 Id. at 758.
2 " The Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of
1975, tit. II, § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 57b (Supp, V 1975).
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power to order "public notification" of a trade violation, did not indicate a
congressional understanding that the agency itself lacked authority to order
corrective advertising. 29 The court also decided that the Supreme Court's
recent extension of first amendment protection to commercial speech did
not bar the remedy since its imposition is an instance of legitimate govern-
mental regulation of false or misleading advertising. 30 The court found ju-
dicial support for the corrective advertising remedy in prior cases applying
the well established concept "that under certain circumstances an advertiser
may be required to make affirmative disclosure of unfavorable facts." 3 '
Thus, as mentioned above, the court based the FTC's authority to require
corrective advertising on two fundamental propositions: 1) in framing rem-
edies, the Commission is not strictly limited by the literal language of the
Federal Trade Commission Act and 2) the corrective advertising order is
within the Commission's remedial authority encompassed by the Act.
Finally:the court ruled that the use of corrective advertising against
Warner-Lambert was warranted and equitable. 32 It found "reasonable" the
Commission's standard for the imposition of the remedy, which required
the agency to prove both that the false advertisements played a substantial
role in creating an erroneous consumer belief and that the belief did not
dissipate after the advertisements were stopped. 33 Based on the record be-
fore it, the court held that the Commission met its burden of proof on
these prerequisites." It found persuasive the Commission's use of scientific
consumer survey evidence and the testimony of experts and concluded that
these constituted "substantial evidence in support of the need for corrective
advertising in this case." 35 The court, however, disagreed with the Commis-
sion in one respect. Characterizing the FTC-ordered statement "contrary to
prior advertising" as a "confessional preamble", the court noted that
neither of the two purposes potentially served by the phrase—calling atten-
tion to the corrective message or humiliating the advertiser—were necessary
for the Commission's goal." The court accordingly deleted this phrase
from the corrective message and affirmed the order as so modified.
While agreeing with the majority that Warner-Lambert should cease
and desist its cold and sore throat claims, Judge Robb, in dissent, asserted
that the imposition of a corrective message in fUture advertisements was
beyond the scope of the FTC's authority. 37 Judge Robb viewed the agency's
statutory power to enter cease and desist orders as prospective in nature
and concluded that corrective advertising-represents an unauthorized ret-
rospective remedy requiring affirmative statements relating to past claims in
29 562 F.2d at 757-58.
30 Id. at 758-59. After this decision, Warner-Lambert petitioned the court for a rehear-
ing, relying primarily on the argument that the first amendment prohibited the imposition of
corrective advertising. Although the court of appeals ultimately denied the petition, it wrote a
supplemental opinion dealing with the constitutional issue in more detail than had been done
in the earlier opinion. Id. at 768-71.
31 Id. at 759. See cases cited at notes 173-96 infra.
" Id. at 762.
"Id.
34 Id. at 762-63.
"Id. at 763.
39 1d.
" Id. at 764.
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now-truthful advertisements." The dissent also inferred from the 1975
amendment to the FTC Act, which expressly grants a similar power to the
courts, that Congress did not intend for the Commission itself to have this
authority. 3° Finally, the dissent determined that neither the Commission's
antitrust orders's° nor its affirmative disclosure remedies,'" both concededly
valid, provide analogous support for corrective advertising. Judge Robb
concluded that any expansion of the agency's power to remedy the "after-
effects" of discontinued advertising must be made by Congress.42
Warner-Lambert is significant as the first judicial pronouncement on
the validity of the FTC's newly emerging corrective advertising remedy. On
several occasions, the Commission has asserted that it has the authority to
impose corrective advertising, 43 but Warner-Lambert stands as the first ac-
knowledgement of this authority by a federal court. The case is important
not only for the majority's construction of relevant law but also for its rec-
ognition and treatment of the underlying policy considerations which form
the basis for the Commission's very existence. In addition, the court's
guidelines regarding the types of situations in which future Federal Trade
Commission corrective advertising orders will be sustained have practical
import for the future.
This note will initially examine the Federal Trade Commission's au-
thority to issue affirmative orders in advertising. The historical basis for the
Commission's jurisdiction in this area will be set forth and consideration
will be given to the restrictions imposed upon the Commission's remedial
$8 Id. at 764-65, 768.
"Id. at 765-66.
"Id. at 766-67.
4 ' Id, at 767-68.
45 1d. at 768.
43
 The use of corrective advertising to dissipate the lingering effects of prior deception
was first proposed in Campbell Soup Co., 77 F.T.C. 664 (1970). This $ 5 proceeding con-
cerned the respondent's practice of adding marbles to its soups before showing them in televi-
sion commercials, a practice which had the effect of giving the soups a deceptively rich ap-
pearance. Id. at 665. A group of law students, known as Students Opposed to Unfair Practices
(SOUP), sought to intervene in the action, contending that a cease and desist order was in-
adequate to protect the public and that the respondent should be required to disclose the de-
ception in future advertisements. Id. at 669. The Commission believed that corrective advertis-
ing was not warranted in that case but declared: "We have no doubt as to the Commission's
power to require such affirmative disclosures when such disclosures are reasonably related to
the deception found and are required in order to dissipate the effects of that deception." Id.
at 668, 670. SOUP again sought corrective advertising in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81
F,T.C. 398, 426 (1972), affd, 481 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973).
Although the Commiision again declined to impose the remedy, 81 F.T.C. at 473-74, it stated:
"[A]n order requiring corrective advertising is well within the arsenal of relief provisions
which the Commission may draw upon ." Id. at 471.
The Commission subsequently has utilized corrective advertising in various consent or-
ders. See, e.g., Lens Craft Research & bevel. Co., 84 F.T.C. 355, 362, 364 (1974); Wasem's
Inc., 84 F.T.C. 209, 214-15 (1974); Amstar Corp., 83 F.T.C. 659, 673 (1973); Ocean Spray
Cranberries, Inc., 80 F.T.C. 975, 982-83 (1971); ITT Continental Baking Co., 79 F.T.C. 248,
255 (1971). Most recently, as part of a settlement of a civil penalty action for violations of a
1976 Commission cease and desist order, STP Corporation has agreed to run $200,000 worth
of advertisements containing the statement: "As a result of an investigation by the Eirrci into
certain allegedly inaccurate past advertisements for STP's oil additive, STP Corporation has
agreed to a $700,000 settlement." The remedy stems from the company's prior advertisements
claiming that STP oil treatment reduced oil consumption in certain road tests. 3 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 1 21,390 (settlement announced February 9, 1978).
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authority by the due process concept of fair warning. The affirmative rem-
edy in the antitrust context will be examined as arguable support for a sim-
ilar authority in the advertising area and the first part of the note will con-
clude that the Commission does have some affirmative remedial authority.
The second part of the note will address the question whether corrective
advertising falls within this class of affirmative remedies. The permissibility
of corrective advertising will be considered in light of, first, the Warner-
Lambert dissent's distinction between prospective and retrospective reme-
dies, second, the effect of the 1975 amendment to the Federal Trade
Commission Act and, finally, the first amendment. The third part of the
note will focus on the relationship between the new remedy and prior cases
allowing the Commission to order affirmative disclosure of unfavorable
product characteristics. It will be submitted that corrective advertising is a
logical extension of the affirmative disclosure power and additional factors
which support such an extension will be presented. Finally, the fourth part
of the note will attempt to discern, from the Warner-Lambert decision,
guidelines regarding the circumstances under which corrective advertising
may properly be imposed in future cases.
I. FTC POWER TO ISSUE AFFIRMATIVE ORDERS IN CASES OF UNFAIR OR
DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING
The Federal Trade Commission was established in 1915 pursuant to
the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914. 44 This legis-
lation was designed not to deal with the regulation of advertising but rather
to bolster enforcement of the antitrust laws. 45 In fact, it has been suggested
that a different statutory scheme might have been pursued had Congress
been specifically concerned with the problem of false and deceptive adver-
tising." Nevertheless, relying upon the broad language of section 5, 47
which authorizes the agency to prevent unfair or deceptive business prac-
tices, the Commission immediately began to exercise jurisdiction over ad-
vertising. 48
44
 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. El 41-58 (1970).
45 A prime motivation behind the FTC Act was the reaction to the judicial development
of the "rule of reason." The Supreme Court had earlier declared that the Sherman Antitrust
Act only proscribed "unreasonable" restraints of trade. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 68 (1911). For discussion of the political and legislative history of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, see G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL. TRADE CommissioN 1-48 (1924); Baker &
Baum, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act: A Continuing Process of Redefinition, 7 Vit.t..
L. REV. 517 (1962); Baum & Baker, Enforcement, Voluntary Compliance & The Federal Trade
Commission, 38 IND. L.J. 325-37 (1963); Rublie, The Original Plan & Early History of the Federal
Trade Commission, 11 ACAD. Pot_ Sci. Pitoc. 6y6 (1926).
4a
	 SUPTa note 45, 339. Professor Henderson, in the first authoritative
treatise on the Commission, concluded that the agency's jurisdiction over false advertising was
a "fortuitous by-product" of its jurisdiction over antitrust matters. Id.
41 "I U]nfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby declared unlawful." FTC
Act of 1914, ch. 311, 5, 38 Stat. 719 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
4" The Commission's justification for this move appeared in its second Annual Report:
[T]he Commission has been of the opinion that at least those cases in which the
method of competition restrains trade, substantially lessens competition, or tends
to create a monopoly are subject to a proceeding under section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. The Commission has gone further than this, however, and in some
instances where these elements did not appear. as in certain cases of misbranding and
falsely advertising the character of goods where the public was particularly liable to be
misled, the Commission has taken jurisdiction.
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This development met with judicial approval" so that by the early
1920's, FTC jurisdiction in the area was established. However, in 1931, the
Supreme Court gave this authority a restrictive interpretation. In FTC v.
Raladam Co.," the Commission was held powerless to prohibit false and de-
ceptive advertising unless it could show that there was a harmful effect
upon the competitors of the advertiser, regardless of whether or not there
was any harm to consumers exposed to the advertising." Congress re-
sponded to this potential jurisdictional threat 52 by legislatively overruling
Raladam. 53 The Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938 allowed the Commission to pre-
vent not only "unfair methods of competition in commerce" but also "un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce." 54
This amendment to section 5 gave the Commission the power to act
to prevent trade practices which deceived the public, regardless of their ef-
fect upon competition. The expansion of the FTC's authority, represented
by the passage of the Wheeler-Lea Act, indicated an approval of the Com-
mission's and the courts' position that the agency could correct false and
deceptive advertising through section 5. This legislative awareness of the
Commission's advertising jurisdiction was further emphasized by the fact
that the amendment expressly-gave to the agency substantial control over
the advertising of food, drugs, devices and cosmetics." Thus, the
Wheeler-Lea Act not only left indisputable the Commission's jurisdiction
(1916] FTC ANN. REP. 6. For a general discussion of the Commission's jurisdiction over adver-
tising, see Handler, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission over False Advertising, 31
COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1931); MilLstein, The Federal Trade Commission & False Advertising, 64
Coi,tim. L. REv. 439 (1964); Montague, Unfair Methods of Competition, 25 VALI:. L.j. 20 (1915).
4"See FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1922); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. FTC, 258 F. 307, 310-12 (7th Cir. 1919).
" 283 U.S, 643 (1931). In Raladani, the respondent manufactured an "obesity cure,"
which was advertised as the result of scientific research and as safe and effective. The Com-
mission found that the preparation could not be used safely except under medical direction
and advice, and consequently ordered the respondent to cease its representations unless ac-
companied by a statement to that effect. Id. at 644.46.
"Id. at 649, 654. Accord, FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 215-16 (1933).
as The Raladam case threatened to remove from the Commission's power those cases in
which the violator's competitors were employing the same practice, or in which the violator
had a monopoly in the field. Even though the Commission could usually show a harmful
competitive effect, the limitation was serious because "considerable time and money had to be
expended in many cases in order to do so ...." H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1937).
53 Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970). The objective of the Act
was described as follows:
((The of the things it will do is to relieve the Federal Trade Commission of the
necessity of showing injury to a competitor. That is one of the practical purposes
of the legislation. This will save unnecessary time and expense in showing that an
act is injurious to a competitor. Indeed, the principle of the act is carried further
to protect the consumer as well as the competitor, In practice the main feature
will be to relieve the Commission of this burden, but we go further and afford a
protection to the consumers of the country that they have not heretofore en-
joyed.
83 Cotqc, REC. 391-92 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Lea). See also H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1937).
" Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, § 3, 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(1) (1970).
"Id., § 4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 52-56 (1970).
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over false advertising but also strengthened its role as protector of both the
consumer and the competitor."
A. Affirmative Orders and the Problem of Fair Warning
While the broad language of section 5 allowed the Commission to ex-
tend its jurisdiction to advertising, that language did not define the extent
to which the agency would be able to regulate false and deceptive advertis-
ing. When establishing the scope of the Commission's remedial authority,
Congress rejected the enumeration of proscribed acts and instead chose the
general words "unfair" and "deceptive."" This was done "in order to pre-
vent clever circumvention of a more precise definition, thereby insuring the
ability of the Commission to define norms of acceptable business be-
havior."58 Thus, it was left to the Commission to determine on a case-by-
case basis the practices prohibited by the statute.
This decision, although providing a workable framework for the
Commission's control of business activities, gave rise to due process con-
cerns since the general language did not give specific notice to individual
businesses that a certain course of conduct was in violation of the Act." As
one court stated, "a businessman would be unable to determine whether a
particular practice was made unlawful until the Commission . and courts
gave the general language specific substance."" This problem could assume
constitutional dimensions should a businessman be deprived of property
for failure to comply with the statutory requirements. Thus, a company
56 See generally Handler, The Control of False Advertising under the Wheeler-Lea Act, 6 Law
AND ConrrEmP. Paoli. 91 (1939); Legislative Note, 39 CoLum. L. REV. 259 (1939); Note, The Con-
sumer & Federal Regulation of Advertising, 53 HARV. L. REV, 828 (1940).
51
 See note 5 supra.
'a Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 324 (9th Cir. 1974). This rationale first was expressed
in the House Conference Report:
It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices. There is
no limit to human inventiveness in this field. Even if all known unfair practices
were specifically defined and prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin
over again. If Congress were to adopt the method of definition, it would under-
take an endless task.
H.R. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914), quoted in Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d at 323
n.5. See also FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-44 (1972).
59
 Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 324 (9th Cir. 1974), citing 51 CoNG. Rcc. 13,114-15
(1914) (remarks of Senator McCumber).
If, in addition to allowing the Commission to define what acts would be prohibited
under § 5, Congress had provided that the Commission could impose civil or criminal penal-
ties for violations, the statute might have been successfully challenged as violative of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. The Supreme Court has stated generally:
That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently
explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will ren-
der them liable to its penalties, is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike
with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law. And a statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law.
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). See also Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954); In-
ternational. Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 223-24 (1914); Collins v. Kentucky, 234
U.S. 634, 637-38 (1914).
60 Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 324 (9th Cir. 1974),
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that engaged in a particular course of conduct, not obviously unfair or de-
ceptive, in good faith reliance on past •business practice, would be exposed
to liability if the Commission subsequently determined that the practice vio-
lated the statute.
To avoid these potential due process problems, Congress in 1914 de-
cided against the imposition of civil or criminal liability based on a Com-
mission finding of a violation. Instead, it provided that "[i]f ... the Com-
mission shall be of the opinion that the method of competition or the act or
practice in question is prohibited by [the FTC Act], it shall ... issue an
order requiring such person, partnership, or corporation to cease and de-
sist from using such method of competition or such act or practice" The
prospective nature of the cease and desist order allowed Congress to retain
the broad proscriptive language by obviating the problem of an ex post
facto identification of certain conduct as illegal." In addition, this curb was
considered necessary so that the Commission's remedial power would re-
main consistent with the agency's purpose, which was to develop principles,
based on different factual contexts, that would serve as guidelines for the
business world." Permitting the Commission to attach consequences on the
basis of past conduct that had not been identified as wrongful, through
either criminal punishment or private relief, was thought inconsistent with
the "quasi-legislative and educational function" contemplated by Con-
gress."
The remedial limitation inherent in section 5's language is best illus-
trated by the case of Heater v. FTC." There, the respondent had engaged
in numerous deceptions and misrepresentations in connection with the ad-
vertising and sale of franchises which authorized the franchisees to sell
memberships in a credit card program." The Commission had ordered the
respondent not only to discontinue the unfair and deceptive business prac-
51
 FTC Act, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970). For a discussion of this accommodation and a
comparison with the more stringent enforcement provisions of the Clayton Act, see Holloway
v. Bristol-Meyers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 990-92 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
62
 In Heater v. FTC, the Ninth Circuit noted that:
1110 reconcile the Commission's broad power with the need for a specific notice
to an individual who must conform his behavior to the terms of the (FTC] Act,
Congress limited the consequences of violation of the Act to a cease and desist
order. It withheld from the Commission the power to make a determination
which would expose the businessman to liability for acts occurring before the
Commission gave the general definition specific meaning in a factual context.
Heater, 503 F.2d 321, 324 (9th Gir. 1974), See FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 432 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
It has been held that the general language of § 5 is not void for indefiniteness because
the term "unfair methods of competition" is sufficiently certain so as to be generally under-
stood. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1919). Although the language
does not define what practices are to be prohibited by the statute, the court in Sears observed
that the Commission's function is not to impose punishment but simply to prevent unfair
trade practices, stating that the statute "is remedial and orders to desist are civil ...."
as
	51 CONG. REC. 13,116 (1914) (remarks of Senator Newlands), cited in Heater v.
FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 324 (9th Cir. 1974).
04
 Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 324 (9th Cir. 1974).
25 Id.
" Universal Credit Acceptance Corp., 82 F.T.C. 570, 642-44, 11970-1973 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) § 20,240 at 22,240-41 (final order to cease and desist issued
February 16, 1973).
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tices but also to make restitution of money gained from those practices."
Upon review of the order, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit examined the relevant legislative history and concluded that
the FTC was without statutory authority to order restitution." The court
reasoned that allowing the remedy would contradict the statutory scheme:
"[I]t would permit the Commission to order private relief for harm caused
by acts which occurred before the Commission had declared a statutory vio-
lation, and thus before giving notice that the prior conduct was within the
statutory purview."69
 The outcome of the Heater case accordingly demon-
strates that the legislative solution to the due process problem limited the
Commission's remedial power under section 5 to the prohibition of illegal
practices for the future.
Although the Commission's remedial power was thus limited by the
1914 Act, the manner in which Congress defined the Commission's area of
activity reveals that section 5 contains both a restriction on and an expan-
sion of FTC authority. While limited to prohibiting violations in the future,
the Commission is empowered to issue cease and desist orders to fill in the
general language used by Congress." The courts have recognized that in
order to fulfill effectively its statutory mandate in applying section 5's gen-
eral outline to particular fact situations, the Commission must have wide
latitude in determining what action is to be taken. 7 ' In addition, the exper-
tise gained by the Commission's specializing in this field has provided sup-
port for judicial deference to the agency's ability not only to identify viola-
87 503 F.2d. at 321.
"Id. at 324-25.
"Id. at 323.
7° FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 484-87 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice
Jackson stated that
(Congress' must legislate in generalities and delegate the final detailed choices to
some authority with considerable latitude to conform its orders to administrative
as well as legislative policies.
... The statute, in order to rule any individual case, requires an additional
exercise of discretion and that last touch of selection which neither the primary
legislator nor the reviewing court can supply. The only reason for the interven-
tion of an administrative body is to exercise a grant of unexpended legislative
power to weigh what the legislature wants weighed, to reduce conflicting abstract
policies to a concrete net remainder of duty or right. Then, and then only, do we
have a completed expression of the legislative will, in an administrative order
which we may call a sort of secondary legislation, ready to be enforced by the
courts.
Id.
" Focusing on the Commission's power under § 5 to prohibit unfair or deceptive busi-
ness practices, the Supreme Court has observed:
It is important to note the generality of these standards of illegality; the proscrip-
tions in § 5 are flexible, to be defined with particularity by the myriad of cases
from the Field of business.'
This statutory scheme necessarily gives the Commission an influential role
in interpreting 5 and in applying it to the facts of particular cases arising out of
unprecedented situations.
FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 384-85 (1965) (quoting FTC v. Motion Picture
Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953)).
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tions72
 but also to prescribe appropriate remedies." Because of these two
factors—the Commission's skill gained through experience and the broad
language of section 5—the courts, in reviewing Commission remedies, have
followed the limited standard expressed by the Supreme Court in Jacob
Siegel Co. v. FTC: 74
The Commission is the expert body to determine what remedy is
necessary to eliminate the unfair or deceptive trade practices
which have been disclosed. It has wide latitude for judgment and
the courts will not interfere except where the remedy selected
has no reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found to
exist. 75
The Commission's broad discretionary power to determine the ap-
propriate remedy to correct a violation favors the view that it may go be-
yond a simple prohibitory order and may require the offender to take
some affirmative action. Nevertheless, because of both the constitutional
prohibition on the punishment of behavior not found to be illegal at the
time of its occurrence and the fact that the only remedy authorized by the
statute is the cease and desist order, the permissibility of such affirmative
orders is not indisputable. Since Congress imposed limits on the FTC's re-
medial authority, the Commission's discretionary power to deal with unfair
or deceptive business practices is not of itself sufficient to support an ex-
tension of that power to affirmative relief. Thus, the threshold question in
Warner-Lambert concerned whether the FTC possesses the authority under
section 5 to issue affirmative orders in general," since corrective advertis-
ing is a type of affirmative remedy. The majority opinion resolved this
issue in favor of affirmative remedies by reliance on the judicial treatment
of the Commission's antitrust remedies." Because the antitrust cases fur-
nished significant support for the Warner-Lambert decision, a consideration
of those cases is appropriate.
72
 FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965). "[Ms an administrative
agency which deals continually with cases in the area, the Commission is often in a better posi-
tion than are courts to determine when a practice is 'deceptive' within the meaning of the
Act." Id.
"E.g., FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952) ("Congress placed the primary
responsibility for fashioning such orders upon the Commission, and Congress expected the
Commission to exercise a special competence in formulating remedies to deal with problems in
the general sphere of competitive practices."); Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461,
498, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959) ("The Commission is the expert body to determine what
remedy is necessary to eliminate the unfair and deceptive practices disclosed by the record,
and it has wide latitude for judgment. Shaping a remedy is essentially an administrative func-
tion. Congress has entrusted the Commission with the responsibility of selecting the means of
achieving a statutory policy—the relation of remedy to nolicy is peculiarly a matter for admin-
istrative competence.").
74
 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
75 1d. at 611-13. Accord, FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 392 (1959) ("One can-
not generalize as to the proper scope of these orders. It depends on the facts of each case and
a judgment as to the extent to which a particular violator should be fenced in."); FTC v. Na-
tional Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428 (1957) ("Mlle Commission is clothed with wide discretion
in determining the type of order that is necessary to bring an end to the unfair practices
found to exist.").
7" 562 F.2d at, 756.
"Id. at 756-57.
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B. Antitrust Orders Under Section 5
The scope of the Commission's power under section 5 has been ac-
knowledged as reaching many of the trade practices also prohibited by the
Sherman Act." However, the Supreme Court initially held the view that in
proceeding against antitrust violators under section 5, the FTC could issue
only negative cease and desist orders and could not require the violator to
take affirmative action. In FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co.," the Court struck
down a divestiture order as beyond the Commission's statutory authority,"
stating that the agency "has not been delegated the authority of a court of
equity."B 1 This early view, however, did not prevail.
In 1963, the Supreme Court held in Pan American World Airways, Inc.
v. United States" that the Civil Aeronautics Board had primary jurisdiction
over a suit brought against an airline charged with violations of the Sher-
man Act. The decision was based on the Court's interpretation of section
411 of the Federal Aviation Act," a section patterned after section 5 of the
FTC Act, which prohibited unfair or deceptive acts in air transportation
and empowered the Board to issue cease and desist orders. The Court rea-
soned that this agency, like the FTC, must define the scope of the statute's
general language on a case-by-case basis" and that the cease and desist
power was broad enough to encompass the power to compel divestiture."
More importantly, the Court expressly contradicted the earlier Eastman
Kodak line of reasoning, stating: "Authority to mold administrative decrees
is indeed like the authority of courts to frame injunctive decrees subject
of course to judicial review.... [T]he power to order divestiture need not
be explicitly included in the powers of an administrative agency to be part
of its arsenal of authority... . "88
In FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 87 the Court extended to the FTC this power
to impose remedies not expressly provided for by statute. There, the
Commission had begun proceedings under section 5 of the FTC Act and
section 7 of the Clayton Acts° challenging the merger of two companies. It
applied for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to
T8 See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683. 691.92 (1948), in which the Court stated
that "soon after its creation the Commission began to interpret the prohibitions of § 5 as in-
cluding those restraints of trade which were also outlawed by the Sherman Act, and ... this
Court has consistently approved that interpretation of the [FTC) Act." For the Commission's
own view, see note 48 supra:
" 274 U.S. 619 (1927).
88 Id, at 625.
"' Id. at 623.
81
 371 U.S. 296, 310 (1963).
8J
	 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970).
84 371 U.S. at 307-08. The Court stated that "[Me have said enough to indicate that the
words 'unfair practices' and 'unfair methods of competition' are not limited to precise prac-
tices that can readily be catalogued. They take their meaning from the facts of each case and
the impact of particular practices on competition and monopoly." Id.
55 1d. at 312. The Court concluded that "where the problem lies within the purview of
the Board, ... Congress must have intended to give it authority that was ample to deal with
the evil at hand." Id.
"Id. at 312 n.17.
384 U.S. 597 (1966).
" Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits the acquisition by one corporation of the stock
of another where it tends to lessen competition or to create a monopoly. 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1970).
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maintain the status quo until it determined the legality of the merger. In a
5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the appellate court had the
power to issue a preliminary injunction" and that the FTC had the au-
thority to request such relief." In this latter holding, the Court concluded
that Congress must have intended the Commission to exercise the power to
take such affirmative action, asserting that "[sluch ancillary powers have
always been treated as essential to the effective discharge of the Commis-
sion's responsibilities."" It further noted that the restrictive literal view of
section 5, as expressed in Eastman Kodak, had been repudiated by the Pan
American case." Thus, under the Dean Foods reasoning, the Commission's
antitrust authority encompasses the equitable relief necessary to deal
adequately with monopolistic business practices. 93
The Warner-Lambert majority viewed the judicial expansion of the
FTC's antitrust remedial power under section 5 as leading to the conclusion
that the Commission can go beyond the simple negative cease and desist
order when dealing with any section 5 violation. 84 The dissent, on the other
hand, reasoned that antitrust remedies could not be used to support a cor-
rective advertising order framed in cease and desist language because the
two areas were inherently different. The antitrust remedial powers, the dis-
sent urged, must be viewed in the context of the Statutory scheme giving
the FTC extensive authority to enforce the antitrust provisions." Such
powers were to be distinguished from the sole authority of the Commission
under section 5, the issuance of cease and desist orders; since the section
does not provide for any type of affirmative remedy, the dissent concluded
that the antitrust cases do not support its judicial enlargement."
" The All Writs Act empowers the federal courts to "issue all writs necessary or appro-
priate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of
law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970).
'° 384 U.S. at 606-07.
91 Id. at 607.
"Id. at 606 n.4.
96 The Dean Foods reasoning has been followed by other courts. See, e.g., L.G. Balfour
Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d I, 23 (7th Cir. 1971) (FTC's power to order divestiture of monopolies,
the court noting the Commission's broad discretion in choosing a remedial norm); Charles
Pfizer & Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574, 586 (6th. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S, 9'20 (1969)
(FTC's power to order compulsory licensing of a patent on a reasonable royalty basis); Luria
Bros. v. FTC, 389 F.2d 847, 861-63 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 829 (1968) (FTC's power to
limit the purchases of certain products between respondents).
" 562 F.2d at 757.
96 The FTC, for example, has enforcement and administrative authority under the
Sherman Act, §§ 1.8, 15 U.S.C. §.§ 1-8; the Clayton Act (as amended by the Robinson-Patman
Act), §§ 1-15, 26, 15 U.S.C. §.§ 12-27; and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
of 1976, §[} 101-04, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14.
96 562 F.2d at 766-67. Judge Robb stated:
Considered in the light of the specific and extensive statutory underpinning
upon which the Court [in Pan American' based this decision it is a far cry from a
holding that the power to order divestiture was derived only from the authority
to issue cease and desist orders, as the majority opinion suggests. Certainly it
does not follow from [Pan American] that the power of the Federal Trade Com-
mission to order corrective advertising can be derived from its authority to issue
cease and desist orders, standing alone.
... I think [Dean Foods] does not support the majority's leap to the conclu-
sion that the power.to issue a cease and desist order, without more, authorizes
the Commission to enter a corrective advertising order, nor does the decision jus-
tify a conclusion that the corrective order can be sustained under some general
remedial power of the Commission.
Id.	 911
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Judge Robb's reasoning in the Warner-Lambert dissent is not persuasive
since it relies on a perceived fundamental difference between the Commis-
sion's antitrust remedies and its false advertising remedies. The basis for
this difference lies in his view that the "specific and extensive statutory un-
derpinning" for antitrust remedial power supports a broader Commission
jurisdiction in this area, as contrasted with its more limited role in the ad-
vertising field." However, analysis of FTC jurisdiction reveals that Con-
gress has indeed given the Commission the "statutory underpinning" neces-
sary to support a broad view of its advertising authority. For example, the
agency has extensive investigatory and discovery authority to implement its
section 5 power98 as well as the power to issue interpretive rules and regu-
lations defining what it considers to be unfair or deceptive. 99 Moreover, the
FTC was recently given the authority to bring civil actions to redress con-
sumer and other injuries resulting from violations of its rules or final cease
and desist orders. 10° Furthermore, the Commission's statutory authority to
regulate false and deceptive advertising is not limited to the confines of sec-
tion 5. As noted previously, 10 ' the Wheeler-Lea Act expressly brought cer-
tain classes of advertisements within the Commission's dominion.'" In ad-
dition, other legislation has given the agency extensive enforcement and
administrative authority over numerous forms of labeling and advertising
in other areas.'" Although Congress originally viewed antitrust authority
as playing the more important role in the Commission's jurisdiction,'" the
agency's practices over the years under section 5, combined with the ad-
" Id,
9" The Commission is authorized "[do gather and compile information concerning, and
to investigate" the business activities of any company or individual engaged in commerce. FTC
Act, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 46(a) (Supp. V 1975). In addition, the Commission can require the filing
of annual and special reports and written answers to specific questions. Id., 15 U.S.C. § 46(b)
(Supp. V 1975). The agency has other investigatory power as well. Id., 15 U.S.C. § 46(c). (d),
(e) & (h) (Supp. V 1975). In conducting its investigations, the Commission has extensive au-
thority to receive documentary evidence, conduct depositions and examine witnesses. Id., § 9,
15 U.S.C. § 49 (Supp. V 1975). Criminal penalties are mandated for any wilful obstruction of
these powers. Id., § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 50 (Supp. V 1975).
"Id., § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (Stipp. V 1975). The FTC has the power to issue substantive as
well as procedural regulations and the Commission's regulations are given great weight by the
courts. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 694-98 (D.C. Cir, 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
'°° The Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of
1975, tit. II, § 206, 15 U.S.C. *576 (Supp. V 1975) (adding a new § 19 to the FTC Act). See
text at notes 128-31 infra.
'"' See text at note 55 supra.
' 0 !Through the Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, Congress declared the dissemination of false
advertisements of "food, drugs, devices or cosmetics" to be unfair or deceptive within the
meaning of § 5. FTC Act, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 52 (Supp. V 1975). In addition, it gave the FTC
power to seek temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions against such adver-
tisements in the district courts as well as establishing criminal penalties for health-endangering
violations of the Act. Id., §§ 13, 14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 53, 54 (Supp. V 1975).
105 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 68-68j (1970) (the Wool Products Labeling Act); 15 U.S.C.
§§ 69-69j (1970) (the Fur Products Labeling Act); 15 U.S.C. §§ 70-70k (1970) (the Textile
Fiber Products Identification Act); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1204 (1970) (the Flammable Fabrics Act);
15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1970) (the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act); 15
U.S.C. §§ 1451-1461 (1970) (the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665
(1970) (the Truth in Lending Act); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-16811 (1970) (the Fair Credit Reporting
Act).
"'See text at notes 45-48 supra.
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ditional jurisdictional legislation, reveal that the FTC has become the gov-
ernmental agency primarily charged with the regulation of advertising.
These factors indicate that the Commission's advertising jurisdiction has a
"statutory underpinning" sufficient to support an affirmative remedial
power.
Moreover, in the modern consumer protection trend, FTC control of
deceptive advertising has played an increasingly important role in the gov-
ernmental regulatory scheme.'" In line with this role, the courts have
given the Commission extensive authority to interpret the meaning and ef-
fect of advertisements.'°° This enlarged role and the "statutory underpin-
ning" upon which it is based tend to refute the Warner-Lambert dissent's re-
strictive view of FTC remedial authority over deceptive advertising. In-
stead, they support the majority's conception of the Commission's power to
remedy deceptive advertising as co-extensive with its acknowledged au-
thority to issue affirmative orders to correct antitrust violations. Thus, de-
spite the Commission's limited remedial powers dictated by the due process
problem inherent in the statutory language, the Commission has been al-
lowed to go beyond the literal language of section 5. Departure from the
simple cease and desist order, when needed, seems appropriate for adver-
tising violations, as well as for antitrust violations.
II. FTC POWER To ORDER CORRECTIVE ADVERTISING
The concept that the Federal Trade Commission can require a vio-
lator to take some affirmative action in the future is a step beyond section
5's express authorization of cease and desist orders. However, acceptance
of the Warner-Lambert majority's viewpoint that affirmative orders in both
the antitrust and deceptive advertising contexts are within the ambit of sec-
tion 5 does not automatically lead to the conclusion that corrective advertis-
ing orders are within the Commission's powers. As the Warner-Lambert
court observed, the question remains whether corrective advertising is in-
cluded in the class of affirmative remedies to which the Commission may
look.' 07
 The boundaries of this class are defined in terms of three different
subject matters: the prospective/retrospective distinction, the 1975 Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act, and the first amendment.
A. The ProspectivelRetrospective Distinction
The dissent in Warner-Lambert expressed the view that mandatory cor-
rective advertising was beyond the FTC's authority due to section 5's au-
thorization of prospective remedies only.' 08 According to Judge Robb,
in For a favorable view of Commission regulation of advertising, see Pitofsky, Beyond
Nader: Consumer Protection and the. Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV. L. Rev. 661 (1977). Profes-
sor Pitofsky argues that governmental intervention, through the FTC, is required to protect
consumers adequately in that it is the only viable means of ensuring that advertising will pro-
vide relevant and truthful market information. Id. at 663-75.
"6 See notes 71-72 supra and text at notes 214-18 infra, See generally, Pitofsky, supra note
105, at 675-79.
107
 562 F.2d at 757.
'° Id. at 764-65 (Robb, J., dissenting). Judge Robb reasoned that the Commission's au-
thority to enter cease and desist orders is prospective in nature .... I think [the Commission's
broad discretionary authority] does not encompass the power to employ the retrospective
remedy of corrective advertising .. ." Id.
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when the Commission finds an unfair or deceptive practice, the limit of its
authority is to stop the conduct so as to protect the public in the future. In
his view, once the practice is ended pursuant to a simple cease and desist
order, any further requirement of a corrective message relates to the now-
ended advertisements. Thus, since corrective advertising endeavors to ab-
rogate the effects of this past conduct, it is retrospective in nature and ex-
ceeds the limits of the Commission's section 5 authority. In illustrating this
viewpoint, the dissent stated that "when Warner-Lambert has ceased and
desisted from advertising Listerine as a remedy for colds and sore throats
there will be nothing to correct in the text of the Listerine advertisements.
Any 'corrective statement' will relate solely to past advertising."'" In addi-
tion, since the imposed statement in future truthful advertisements pre-
sumably would involve a detriment to the advertiser, the dissent regarded
the imposition of such a statement as a form of punishment for the past
deceptive advertisements. Under Judge Robb's view, the due process prob-
lem, resolved by Congress' original action, is resurrected since the remedy
does not have a solely prospective effect and, in fact, imposes punishment
for past deeds. Judge Robb found support for his concern"° in the hold-
ings of the Supreme Court which state that "the effect of the Commission's
[cease and desist) order is not to punish or to fasten liability on respon-
dents for past conduct but to ban specific practices for the future in ac-
cordance with the general mandate of Congress."'" Because the
prospective/retrospective distinction can be viewed as a significant obstacle
to corrective advertising authority, further analysis of the distinction is re-
quired.
The Commission in Warner-Lambert justified corrective advertising on
the ground that it does not relate solely to past conduct but rather serves to
prevent future public deception in the form of lingering erroneous beliefs
engendered by the past advertising. "2
 Observing that the courts have tra-
ditionally given to the agency wide latitude in fashioning the proper relief
to correct a violation, it reasoned that "the Commission has authority to
order the relief necessary to adequately protect the public from the effects
of a law violation."" 3
 The Commission thus had concluded that Warner-
Lambert must engage in the affirmative remedy of corrective advertising
since consumer beliefs that Listerine will prevent or cure colds and sore
throats cannot be dispelled by a simple cease and desist order."* The cir-
'n Id. at 768 (Robb, J., dissenting).
"° Id. at 764-65.
1 " FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 706 (1948). Accord, FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343
U.S. 470, 473 (1952) ("Orders of the Federal Trade Commission are not intended to impose
criminal punishment or exact compensatory damages for past acts, but to prevent illegal prac-
tices in the future."); L.F. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d I, 24 (7th Cir. 1971) ("[T]he Commis-
sion's orders are to serve a remedial and not a punitive function."); Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322
F.2d 765, 768 (3d Cir. 1963) ("The purpose of the Federal Trade Commission Act is to pro-
tect the public, not to punish a wrongdoer ...."), quoted in FTC v. Cinderella Career and
Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
" 2
 See text at notes 20-23 supra.
" 3
 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1499 (1975), [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
1 21,066, at 20,934 (emphasis added). •
" 4
 Because of the significant continuing injury to both consumers and Listerine's com-
petition, the Commission's opinion concluded that "an order merely requiring cessation of the
deceptive advertising would not afford the public adequate protection. The lingering false be-
liefs must be dispelled, a task which requires corrective advertising." Id. at 1504, [1973-1976
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cuit court accepted this reasoning, observing that consumers would be de-
ceived if they continued to make purchases in reliance upon a reputation
that was not deserved." 5 Judge Wright further stated:
[C]urrent and future advertising of Listerine, when viewed in
isolation, may not contain any statements which are themselves
false or deceptive. But reality counsels that such advertisements
cannot be viewed in isolation; they must be seen against the
background of over 50 years in which Listerine has been
proclaimed—and purchased—as a remedy for colds. When
viewed from this perspective, advertising which fails to rebut the
prior claims as to Listerine's efficacy inevitably builds upon those
claims; continued advertising continues the deception, albeit im-
plicitly rather than explicitly. It will induce people to continue to
buy Listerine thinking it will cure colds.'"
The Warner-Lambert court appears correct in regarding the residual
effect of past deceptive advertising as a continuing wrong. Under this view
of the lingering deception, corrective advertising can be seen as preventing
a future illegal practice, and consequently, as a permissible affirmative
remedy under section 5. The objective of a corrective advertising order is
to deal with the phenomenon that prior deceptive advertisements have
generated erroneous beliefs regarding the product in the minds of con-
sumers, which beliefs will remain as an influence on purchasing decisions
even after the advertisements have been stopped.''' Thus, future "honest"
advertisements, by failing to rebut this residual deception, merely continue
the violation and are deceptive themselves. Even though truthful, the later
advertisements serve to reinforce or strengthen the misleading latent im-
ages of the product created by the past false advertisements.'" Moreover,
because of the lingering beliefs, the violator continues to enjoy sales and to
reap profits based, at least in part, on the prior deception. Failure to cor-
rect the residual deception in future advertisements preserves this unfair
competitive advantage.
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 21,066, at 20,937. The Commission's argument
before the Warner-Lambert court was summarized as follows:
The Commission's position .. • is that the affirmative disclosure that Listerine will
not prevent colds or lessen their severity is absolutely necessary to give effect to
the prospective cease and desist order; a hundred years of false cold claims have
built up a large reservoir of erroneous consumer belief which would persist, un-
less corrected, long after petitioner ceased making the claims.
562 F.2d at 756.
E" 562 F.2d at 761 n.58.
"o Id. at 769 (supplemental opinion on petition for rehearing) (footnote omitted).
'' See Note, Illusion or Deception: The Use of "Props" and "Mock-Ups" in Television Advertis-
ing, 72 YALE L.J. 145, 156 n.46 (1962).
"" The Commission's ability to deal with future truthful advertisements hinges upon
whether the advertisements actually do encourage the retention of erroneous beliefs. If re-
sidual deception can be shown, corrective advertising becomes appropriate. The Commission
has always had the power to..prohibit truthful advertisements if, due to the particular circum-
stances of the case, the effect upon consumers is one of deception. See, e.g., P. Lorillard Co. v.
FTC, 186 F.2d 52, 58 (4th Cir. 1950) (prohibiting the selective reporting of test information
due to its deceptive effect); see also Koch v. FTC, 206 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1953) ("Mhe mere
fact that words and sentences may be literally and technically true does not prevent their
being framed so as to mislead or deceive.").
919
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Viewed.in this manner, corrective advertising has both prospective
and retrospective qualities; it focuses upon past acts of deception but only
to prevent future wrong. This highlights the fact that a rigid prospective/
retrospective distinction is unrealistic since every Commission order neces-
sarily looks to the future as well as to the past:
Every Commission order is "retrospective," in the sense that it
looks to and is based upon the causes and results of the acts
found to violate the statute, and at the same time it is "prospec-
tive" in the sense that its design, purpose, and effect is to dissi-
pate any lingering effects of the past violations and to prevent
their recurrence in the future.'"
The fact that a corrective advertising order is based upon past acts of
deception should not prove fatal, however, since it is not the retrospective
nature of a certain order that offends section 5 but rather its tendency to
impose civil or criminal liability."° This concept was expressly recognized
in Heater v. FTC,'" in which the Ninth Circuit held that the Commission
lacked statutory authority to order restitution of money gained from a de-
ceptive business practice. 122
 In that case, however, the court distinguished
corrective advertising which seeks not to attach consequences to prior acts
through the adjudication of private rights or otherwise, but rather to pro-
tect the public from future deception.'" Corrective advertising is designed
to halt a future illegal practice—the sale of a product based on an errone-
ous impression residing in the public mind. On the other hand, the restitu-
tion order struck down by the Heater court was designed to mitigate the in-
jury already suffered through the imposition of civil liability.
Following this reasoning, the decree in Warner-Lambert can be deemed
"retrospective" insofar as it focuses on the prior deceptive claims. Yet its
function is to provide the public with relevant, truthful information for the
future, not to impose any liability for past wrongful conduct. It should not
be viewed as conflicting with section -5 because it seeks to halt the continu-
ing influence of past Listerine advertisements over future consumer pur-
"" Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F.T.C. 1472, 1514 (1971), quoted in Heater v. FTC, 503
F,2d 321, 325 n.13 (9th Cir. 1974).
120
 See text at note 111 supra.
'' 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974).
14 ' See text at notes 65-69 supra.
1 " 503 F.2d at 324-25 n.13. The Heater court stated that:
Our holding denies retroactive impact to a Commission decision, at least insofar
as private rights and liabilities are involved....
We recognize that divestiture and corrective advertising orders support the
Commission's position that it has power, in order to remedy the continuing ef-
fects of violations of the Act, to order acts imposing economic costs properly at-
tributed to conduct occurring before the conduct is declared illegal. Moreover,
we recognize that there is no economic difference in the impact of those orders
and a restitution order—in each case the offender loses the benefits of money
expended in reliance on the legality of conduct later found illegal. Nevertheless,
the two cases must be treated differently because Congress, out of reasonable fair
notice considerations, chose to leave the cure of private injuries caused by viola-
tions of the Act to whatever common law remedies existed.
Id. The Court in Warmer-Lambert found this reasoning persuasive, stating that "restitution is
not corrective adveitising. Ordering refunds to past consumers is very different from ordering
affirmative disclosure to correct misconceptions which future consumers may hold." 562 F.2d
at 757 n.33 (emphasis in original).
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chasing decisions. Concededly, the effect of a corrective message, in terms
of deleterious economic consequences for an advertiser, may be the same as
if restitution had been ordered. Yet, this alone should not defeat the or-
der's validity under section 5 because even traditional cease and desist or-
ders have an adverse economic impact. Moreover, the protection of the
public interest through corrective advertising should not be subordinated to
the advertiser's interest in the profits derived from deceptive advertising.
Thus, even though based on past deception, the corrective advertising
remedy is essentially "prospective" in nature and should be upheld on that
basis.
Further support for this view of corrective advertising as designed to
prevent future illegal activity is furnished by an analogy to the divestiture
remedy. Although the Sherman Act does not expressly provide for divesti-
ture, it has been authorized by the courts on the rationale that it is neces-
sary to protect the public interest.' 24 The mere prohibition of future illegal
conduct allows the violator to continue to reap new gains from past wrongs.
The affirmative remedy of divestiture is required to prevent the realization
of future benefits from a current competitive advantage which was secured
by past wrongful activity.'" Moreover, it has a deterrent effect since the
cessation of profits accruing from the illegal practice as well as the ad-
ditional costs incurred in effecting the divestiture tend to negate the eco-
nomic benefits derived from the practice. Hence, the wrongdoer will no
longer find it profitable to engage in such conduct. The same rationale
supports corrective advertising since its objectives are similar to those of di-
vestiture. Like divestiture, corrective advertising is an attempt to prevent
the violator from realizing the future benefit of his illegal gains—in the
case of the deceptive advertising, the increased profits and greater share of
the market that result from consumer reliance on the false claims. In addi-
tion, the future costs and other consequences accompanying the imposed
corrective message tend to remove the economic incentive to engage in de-
ceptive advertising. As noted previously,' 20
 the courts have seen fit to allow
the Commission broad equitable powers to remedy antitrust violations. The
Commission should have a comparable power when the unfair trade prac-
tice takes the form of deceptive advertising."'
B. The 1975 FTC Improvement Act
In 1975, Congress amended the Federal Trade Commission Act so
that, under some circumstances, the Commission can bring civil actions to
'" See United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326-27 (1961).
'" In affirming the divestiture of illegally acquired theatres, the Supreme Court in
Shine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948), stated:
In this type of case we start from the premise that an injunction against future
violations is not adequate to protect the public interest. If all that was done was
to forbid a repetition of the illegal conduct, those who had unlawfully built their
empires could preserve them intact. They could retain the full dividends of their
monopolistic practices and profit from the unlawful restraints of trade which
they had inflicted on competitors.
Id. at 128.
128 See text at notes 78-106 supra.
127 See generally Note, Corrective Advertising & the FIG: No, Virginia, Wonder Bread Doesn't
Help Build Strong Bodies Twelve Ways, 70 MiCfl. L. RED. 374, 391-95 (1971).
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redress injury to consumers resulting from a violation of section 5. 128
Under the statute, the courts may provide necessary relief, including "pub-
lic notification" of the unfair or deceptive practice,'" but only if the decep-
tive practice violates a Commission rule or final cease and desist order, and
if the court is satisfied that a reasonable person would have known the
practice to be dishonest or fraudulent.'" These prerequisites are needed to
maintain consistency with Congress' intent that a businessman be put on
notice before he can be held liable for his commercial practices.' 31
In his Warner-Lambert dissent, Judge Robb concluded that because
Congress had granted to the court the power to order public notification,
including corrective advertising, Congress must have understood that the
FTC itself could not order public notification:' 32 "If the Commission al-
ready had that power to order public notification by way of corrective ad-
vertising, why was the amendment necessary?"'" Judge Robb also found
support for his view that the FTC had no power to order corrective adver-
tising in the 1975 amendment's requirement of a showing of bad faith be-
fore a court could order public notification. Focusing on the majority's con-
clusion that the FTC could order the analogous remedy of corrective ad-
vertising even if there were no showing of bad faith, Judge Robb found it
"strange that the Congress would require a court to find bad faith, while
authorizing the Commission to act in the absence of bad faith."'"
In response to this opinion, the majority noted that public' notification
and corrective advertising are not synonymous.'" It asserted that while
corrective advertising can be classified as a form of public notification,'"
the latter seems a broader remedy. The majority further observed that
public notification is to be used expressly "to redress injury"'" to past con-
sumers. Corrective advertising, on the other hand, is aimed at future con-
sumers. MI
The distinction made by the majority between public notification and
corrective advertising appears accurate although it is not as precise as the
Warner-Lambert opinion suggests. As noted previously, 138 a corrective adver-
tising order, like a traditional cease and desist remedy, looks to the prior
deceptive advertisements. In this limited way, it can be said to redress in-
jury. However, its primary purpose is to prevent future deception in the
form of lingering erroneous beliefs. It is intended to promote the informa-
"' The Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of
1975, tit. II, § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 57b (Supp. V 1975).
12? Id., 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (Supp. V 1975).
"Id., 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a) (Supp. V 1975).
'" See text at notes 57.64 supra.
"2 562 F.2d at 765-66 (Robb, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 765.
"' Id.
"5 Id. at 757.
"a Other forms of public notification noted by the court included "requiring the defen-
dant to run special advertisements reporting the FTC finding, advertisements advising con-
sumers of the availability of a refund, or the posting of notices in the defendant's place of
business." Id. at 757 n.36. In addition to his view that public notification includes corrective
advertising, Judge Robb felt that these examples of public notification were "simple variations
of corrective advertisements." Id. at 765.66 (Robb, J., dissenting).
131
 FTC Act, § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (Supp. V• 1975).
"" 562 F.2d at 757.
"'See text at note 119 supra.
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tive function of advertising, i.e., to stop lingering beliefs erroneously held
by consumers through the provision of truthful information, not to relieve
past injury. Similarly, public notification, although intended "to redress in-
jury," is not exclusively retrospective, since it will necessarily be viewed by
prospective consumers as well as by those who have already been deceived.
Yet, the primary purpose of the judicial remedy of public notification is to
mitigate the injury of past consumers, not to preclude the future effects of
residual deception. Because of the different functions served by the two
remedies, it is important to note that Congress provided for public notifica-
tion along with such other remedies as the "rescission or reformation of
contracts, the refund of money or return of property, and the payment of
damages."'" The fact that public notification is most likely to be used in
conjunction with these other remedies, which are clearly retrospective in
nature, supports the idea that its primary function is to hold the
wrongdoer liable for his past injury rather than to prevent a future viola-
tion. The additional requirement that the violator know the practice to be
dishonest or fraudulent is therefore necessary since the statute con-
templates a remedial function similar to the order struck down in Heater v.
FTC."' The narrower corrective advertising order would not be subject to
such a requirement because it does not focus primarily on past conduct.
Although somewhat imprecise, the distinction between the two reme-
dies gives weight to the Warner-Lambert majority's conclusion. that Congress
did not intend the 1975 amendment to affect the Commission's existing au-
thority. 142 There is evidence that Congress recognized that the amendment,
giving remedial authority to a court, must be considered as separate from
and additional to the provisions for the Commission's own authority. The
statute contains the proviso that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed
to affect any authority of the Commission under any other provision of
law."'" In addition, the Conference Committee in its report to Congress
stated that the statute "is 'not intended to modify or limit any existing
power the Commission may have to itself issue orders designed to remedy-
ing [sic] violations of the law. That issue is now before the courts. It is not
the intent of the Conferees to influence the outcome in any way . "144 As the
dissent observed,'" these statements do not answer the question regarding
the extent of the FTC's existing authority. Nevertheless, that existing au-
thority has always encompassed the power to prohibit public deception for
the future.'" Corrective advertising falls within this authority since the fu-
ture advertisements, though literally truthful, will be deceptive themselves
without an accompanying corrective message. The additional power to cor-
rect past violations given to the courts by the statute in order to bolster the
"° FTC Act, 19, 15 U.S.C. 57b(b) (Supp. V 1975).
141
 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974). Sec text at notes 65-69 supra.
142
 562 F.2d at 757-58.
' 43
 FTC Act, § 19, 15 U.S.C..§ 57b(e) (Supp. V 1975), quoted in Warner-Lambert, 562 F.2d
at 757-58.
144
	 REP. No. 1408, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7702, 7774.
' 45
 562 F.2d at 766 (Robb. J., dissenting).
146 Sec text at notes 61-64 supra.
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Commission's consumer protection role' 47 should not lead to an inference
narrowly limiting the Commission's own authority in the area.'" The fact
that Congress has created the authority for the courts to find liability for
wrongful conduct should not preclude a court from construing section 5 as
authorizing corrective advertising ordered by the FTC, an affirmative rem-
edy imposed to prevent future deception.
C. The First Amendment
Even if corrective advertising is statutorily legal, the imposition of
such an order raises constitutional questions since advertising is a form of
speech. In its recent landmark decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 149 the Supreme Court held that
purely commercial speech, such as price and product advertising, is not
"wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment." 15 ° In striking
down a statutory ban on the advertising of prescription drug prices, the
Court noted the individual consumer's strong interest in commercial in-
formation. 15 ' It also identified a general interest that society may have in
"the free flow of commercial information," reasoning that advertising pro-
motes intelligent and informed decision making and a rational allocation of
resources.'" However, the Court noted that there were "commonsense dif-
1 " The amendment's official title lists one of its purposes as being "to amend the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act in order to improve its consumer protection activities ...." The
Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission improvement Act of 1975, tit. 11,
§ 206, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975). For a discussion of how the amendment attempts to effectuate this
purpose, see [1974) U.S. CODE CLING. & Al) NEWS 7702-75.
"'Such an inference is not justified for Congress may have chosen to grant the public
notification power to the courts for reasons other than an absence of similar power in the
FTC. The Warner-Lambert court refuted the dissent's reasoning that the 1975 amendment
promotes the inference that the Commission lacks corrective advertising power by citing FTC
v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 610 (1966) (Court will not construe an agency's request for
authorizing legislation as affirmative proof of no authority) and National Petroleum Refiners
Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 696 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974) (subsequent grant of
congressional authority does not prove agency's prior lack of authority). 562 F.2d at 758 n.39.
19 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
"° Id, at 761-62. See also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rela-
tions, 413 U.S. 376, 388-91 (1973) (upholding a municipal ordinance prohibiting a newspaper
from using discriminatory sex-designated classifications in its employment want advertisements
and implying that first amendment protection might otherwise be extended to commercial
speech); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818-25, 829 (1975) (holding that commercial ad-
vertising enjoys a degree of first amendment protection and reversing a conviction under a
state statute which prohibited any advertisements for abortion clinics); Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 363-83 (1977) (holding that the blanket suppression of all advertising
by attorneys is an unconstitutional infringement of the first amendment). See generally Redish,
The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech & The Values of Free Expression, 39
Geo, WASH. L. Rev. 429 (1971): Note, Commercial Speech—An End in Sight to Chrestensen?, 23
DE-PAUL. L. REV. 1258 (1974); Comment, The Right To Receive & The Commercial Speech Doctrine:
New Constitutional Considerations, 63 GEO. L. J. 775 (1975); 18 B.C. INn. & COM. L. Rev. 276
(1977); 61 Coax ELL L. REV. 640 (1976).
i" 425 U.S. at 763. The Supreme Court noted that "as to the particular consumer's
interest in the free flow of commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener
by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate." Id.
"2 Id. at 765. The Court reasoned that
advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless
dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product,
for what reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free
enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be
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ferences" between commercial speech and other forms of protected
speech. 153 The Court found illustrative of these differences both the fact
that because advertising is linked to commercial profits, it is less likely to be
discouraged by governmental regulation and the fact that the advertiser
can more easily verify the accuracy of the factual assertions made about its
product.'" In his concurring opinion, justice Stewart further elaborated
the distinction by observing that "Liideological expression ... is integrally
related to the exposition of thought" whereas commercial advertising "is
confined to the promotion of specified goods or services." 155 First amend-
ment protection is accorded the latter because of the "information of po-
tential interest and value conveyed .. rather than because of any direct
contribution to the interchange:of ideas."'" Thus, although the Court de-
clared that advertising was within first amendment protection, the ability to
verify commercial speech as well as its capacity to withstand governmental
regulation called fora "different" degree of protection.' 57
This view of commercial speech as having a less significant first
amendment value than other, traditionally protected, types of speech per-
mits regulation of advertising in order to achieve legitimate governmental
ends. The Virginia State Board Court concluded that in order to prevent
false and deceptive advertising, it may be "appropriate to require that a
commercial message appear in such i form, or include such additional in-
formation, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being
deceptive."'" Thus, while bringing commercial speech within the protec-
tion of the first amendment, the Court viewed the protection as not abso-
lute, recognizing the need for the state to be able to deal effectively with
the problem of false and deceptive advertising. The Court's language, how-
ever, does not necessarily indicate that corrective advertising is consti-
tutionally permissible. Read narrowly, the Court's conclusion authorizes a
requirement of disclosure only where the advertisement itself would be de-
ceptive in the absence of such disclosure. Corrective advertising is designed
not to prevent deception that ,otherwise might result from the literal lan-
guage of current advertising, but rather to mitigate the impact of past de-
ceptive claims. Nonetheless, it would appear that corrective advertising does
fall within the range of constitutionally permitted regulations of speech. As
noted previously, 155 an advertisement may be deceptive despite its literal
accuracy by reason of its reinforcement of prior deceptive claims. Applying
this rationale, the court in Warner-Lambert determined that corrective adver-
tising is not forbidden by the first amendment: 15° "The Commission is not
regulating truthful speech protected by the First Amendment, but is merely
requiring certain statements which, if not present in current and future ad-
made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public
interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.
To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.
"3 1d. at 771 n.24.
" 4 /d.
1 " Id. at 779-80 (Stewart, J., concurring).
"'Id. at 780 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
' 37 /d. at 771 n.24.
' 33 /d.
"D See text at notes 112-27 supra.
'° 562 F.2d at 758-59.
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vertisements, would render those advertisements themselves part of a con-
tinuing deception of the public."'°' The constitutional guarantee of free
speech does not mandate a narrower view of the range of deceptive adver-
tising properly subject to governmental regulation. In Virginia State Board,
the Supreme Court observed that there is no constitutional obstacle to the
regulation of "deceptive or misleading" advertising even though it is not
"wholly false," stating that "rtbe First Amendment ... does not prohibit
the State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow
cleanly as well as freely." 182
 Under this reasoning, corrective advertising is
constitutionally warranted to prohibit the misleading effects which would
flow from future truthful advertisements.
The Warner-Lambert court also determined that corrective advertising
would not have a chilling effect on the future truthful speech, relying on
the Supreme Court's recognition that "[s]ince advertising is the sine qua non
of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper
regulation and foregone entirely."'" The circuit court further noted that
any chill that did occur—either through the forced abandonment of the fu-
ture advertising campaign or through the imposed disclaimers in future
advertising—is justified by the fact that the measures are necessary to serve
the consumer's interest in truthful information.'" The court conceded that
corrective advertising may place a burden on the constitutionally protected
right to advertise truthfully since the remedy precludes future advertise-
ments unless accompanied by the corrective message.'" However, it ob-
served that the Commission has a significant interest in protecting against
public deception by eliminating the misleading effects of advertising.'"
The Warner-Lambert court found that this interest would , not be served by a
simple cease and desist order since such a remedy would take no effective
action against residual deception.'" Thus, the court concluded that the
burden imposed on future advertising is justified because corrective adver-
tising "is the least restrictive means of achieving a substantial and important
governmental objective ... 
. "168
The Warner-Lambert court's conclusion that corrective advertising does
not impose an unconstitutional burden on the right to advertise appears
correct in light of the analysis employed by the Supreme Court in Virginia
16 ' Id. at 769 (supplemental opinion on petition for rehearing).
I"
 425 U.S. at 771-72. See also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) ("Advertis-
ing, like all public expression, may be subject to reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate
public interest."); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) ("Advertising that is
false, deceptive, or misleading of course is subject to restraint.").
1 " 562 F.2d at 770 (supplemental opinion on petition for rehearing), quoting Virginia
State Board, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24.
"4 Id. The Warner-Lambert majority observed that a cease and desist order cannot serve
the consumers' interest in truthful information because, by the time a cease and desist order is
issued, the public has already been deceived and the advertising campaign has probably
achieved its goal and given way to a new campaign. Id.
165 Id. Since Listerine's advertisements, without the corrective message, are considered
deceptive themselves, the corrective advertising order in this case imposes no burden on truth-
ful speech. However, the Warner-Lambert court found the corrective advertising order would be
warranted "fe)ven if the current and future advertising of Listerine is considered consti-
tutionally protected speech .
	 ." Id.
188
	 at 771.
" 1 Id.
"8 1d. at 770-71.
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State Board. There, the Court found that the government's interest in regu-
lating the advertising of prescription drugs had some legitimacym but that
the total ban on advertising did not directly promote that interest.'" Thus,
while the Court recognized the validity of governmental regulation of ad-
vertising for legitimate ends, it required the means chosen to be narrowly
tailored to serve those ends. The means chosen by the FTC in Warner-
Lambert are narrowly tailored to further the interest in eradicating public
deception. Warner-Lambert is not prohibited completely from advertising
Listerine in the future but rather must include a message in its advertise-
ments sufficient to dispel latent erroneous impressions. Furthermore, as the
Warner-Lambert majority noted, 17 ' the amount of correction required by the
Commission was not set arbitrarily but rather was determined by reference
to Warner-Lambert's prior investment in deceptive advertising. Thus, un-
like the total prohibition on advertising found in Viriginia State Board, the
Commission's order in. Warner-Lambert' attempts to achieve a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest—the eradication of lingering deception in the public
mind—while still allowing the respondent to exercise fully his constitutional
right to advertise.
It is submitted that the Warner-Lambert court's determination that cor-
rective advertising is within the permissible range of affirmative remedies
to which the Commission may look when dealing with section 5 violations is
correct. A sensible approach to this determination, an approach implicitly
employed by the court, is to reject a rigid adherence to the strict
prospective/retrospective distinction in favor of a more searching review of
the function of the remedy itself. Although it may be deemed retrospective
in some aspects, corrective advertising does not violate section 5 because its
primary objective is to prevent futur6public deception engendered by past
false advertising. This function also distinguishes it from the "public notifi-
cation" remedy given to the courts by the 1975 FTC Improvement Act and
supports the Warner-Lambert court's conclusion that Congress did not in-
tend the Act to restrict the Commission's own remedial power. Finally, cor-
rective advertising is constitutionally sound due to the Supreme Court's
recognition that the state has a legitimate interest in the regulation of
commercial speech in order to prevent deception so long as such corrective
advertising is narrowly tailored to meet those ends.
III. AFFIRMATIVE DISCLOSURE AS PRECEDENT FOR CORRECTIVE
ADVERTISING
The court in Warner-Lambert found further support for the validity of
the corrective advertising remedy in prior cases upholding similar reme-
dies. The majority opinion cited prior cases which held that the Commis-
sion has the power under certain circumstances to compel affirmative dis-
'" 425 U.S. at 766-69. The Court recognized the validity of the State's interest in main-
taining a high degree of professionalism among licensed pharmacists. Id.
"0 1d. at 769-70. The Court asserted that the total ban on advertising was not narrowly
tailored to achieve the governmental interest. It observed that the real justifications for the
ban rested on the assumed reactions that people would have to drug price advertising and
concluded that the advertising ban has no direct effect at all on professional standards. Id.
1 " 562 F.2d at 771.
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closure of unfavorable product characteristics through its cease and desist
orders. It thus viewed corrective advertising as a variation upon a familiar
theme.'" The Warner-Lambert court's conclusion that the affirmative disclo-
sure cases supply exactly pertinent precedent appears inaccurate, however,
since corrective advertising differs in important regards from the affirma-
tive orders previously upheld. Although not entirely on point, however,
those cases do provide some support for the validity of the corrective ad-
vertising remedy.
A. Prior Uses. of Affirmative Disclosure
The Commission has ordered affirniative disclosure primarily in situ-
ations where an advertisement has the capacity to deceive potential pur-
chasers due to its failure td reveal facts material to the representations
made in the advertisement. For example, where a product was advertised
as a cure for baldness, the Commission was allowed to order the manufac-
turer to cease the advertisements unless accompanied by a statement that
baldness is most often caused by heredity, age and endocrine balance, for
which the product is not effective.'" A like result was reached in Feil v.
FTC" where the respondent had falsely advertised its product as effective
for all cases of bedwetting. 175 After noting that the FTC's power under sec-
tion 5. is extensive, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Commission's order pro-
hibiting the advertisements unless clearly and conspicuously limited to cases
of bedwetting not caused by organic defects or diseases. 176 A similar exam-
ple is J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 177 in which the makers of Geritol had adver-
tised that product as an effective cure for tired and run-down feelings. In
reality, Geritol was effective only when those symptoms were due to iron
deficiency anemia, an infrequent cause. Upon review, the Sixth Circuit sus-
tained the Commission's order that respondent disclose in future adver-
tisements that Geritol will only relieve iron deficiency anemia and that the
vast majority of cases of lassitude are not attributable to this deficiency.'"
While such cases clearly support the FTC's authority to compel affir-
mative disclosure, an earlier case, Alberty v. FTC, 179 appeared to hold that
the Commission lacked this power. In this case, as in the later J.B. Williams
case, the Commission had ordered the maker of Geritol to limit its adver-
tisements to cases of lassitude caused by iron deficiency anemia and to state
affirmatively that it is not effective for the more frequent cases not caused
172 Id. at 759.
13 Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952, 953-55 (2c1 Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
827 (1960); Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18, 20-23 (5th Cir. 1960). In
both cases, the courts concluded that failure to make such statements in light of the advertised
claims would be misleading to the public.
' 74 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960).
"3 Id. at 885-96.
178 Id. at 896-902. The court found that the advertisements deliberately conveyed the
idea that the device was effective in all cases when, in reality, it was only effective in some.
Therefore, the court concluded that affirmative disclosure was needed to counteract the mis-
leading effect of the prior false advertisements. Id,
'" 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967).
178 1d. at 890-91. In reaching its conclusion, the court asserted that requiring a manufac-
turer to state what its product will or will not do is desirable because it allows consumers to
make an intelligent choice. Id. at 890.
179
 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 818 (1950).
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Id.
by iron deficiency anemia.' 8 ° The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia upheld the former requirement but struck down the
latter affirmative disclosure requirement. The court was clearly worried
that judicial recognition of the Commission's affirmative disclosure power
would undermine private freedom in commercial marketing and Judge
Prettyman's broad language for the majority indicated a belief that the
Commission could not order such a remedy. 18 ' However, the case was
actually decided on the narrower grounds of section 12 of the FTC Act,
which expressly prohibits the dissemination of certain false advertisements
as an unfair or deceptive act or practice within the meaning of section 5. 182
More specifically, the court relied on section 15, which defines "false adver-
tisement" for the purposes of section 12 (but not for section 5) as one that
is "misleading in a material respect." 183 In determining whether the adver-
tisement is materially misleading, the statute dictates that the Commission
may look at
the extent to which the advertisement fails to reveal facts mate-
rial in the light of such representations or material with respect
to consequences which may result from the use of the commod-
ity to . which the advertisement relates under the conditions pre-
scribed in said advertisement, or under such conditions as are
customary or usual.'"
The court in Alberty thus held that before compelling affirmative disclosure,
the Commission had to find that the failure to disclose was materially mis-
leading as so defined. Because there were no such supportive findings be-
fore the court, it found the affirmative disclosure requirement unwar-
ranted.' 8 5
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Bazelon argued that the court should
defer to the Commission's discretion as to the necessity of the remedy' 88
and that the affirmative disclosure power served to promote the "informa-
tive function" of advertising, a purpose encouraged by the FTC Act.'"
Later courts have preferred Judge Bazelon's reasoning and have confined .
Alberty to the narrow holding that the Commission must make supportive
"° Id. at 37.
"' Id. at 39. Judge Prettyman reasoned that:
Such power seems to us to be no less than the power to control the marketing of
all such products, because, if particular advertisers, selected by the Commission,
can be required not only to state accurately the limited benefits of their products
but also to call attention to what the products will not do, the effect on marketing
is clear enough. Such a requirement seems to us to have no relation to the pre-
vention of falsity in advertising. It is a wholly different power.
[W]e think that the negative function of preventing falsity and the af-
firmative function of requiring, or encouraging, additional interesting, and
perhaps useful, information which is not essential to prevent falsity, are two to-
tally different functions. We think that Congress gave the Commission the Full of
the former but did not give it the tatter.
"2
 FTC Act, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 52(a), (b) (1970).
"3 /d., § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 55 (1970).
"' Id.
122
 182 F.2d at 39.
'sB Id. at 41-42 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
322 Id. at 45 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
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findings before compelling affirmative disclosure.'" 'liberty's broad lan-
guage has never been followed and has been expressly repudiated by at
least one court.'" In discussing the Commission's affirmative disclosure
power, the Warner-Lambert court noted this trend with approval.'" Thus,
although Alberty has never been overruled, later courts have established that
the Commission does have the power to order affirmative disclosure under
certain circumstances.
The affirmative disclosure remedy has been employed in a variety of
situations: to respond to a consumer preference—even if illogical—known
to be a material factor in purchasing decisions: 19 ' to warn consumers of the
dangerous propensities of a product,'" and to inform consumers of their
legal rights and obligations relating to a particular transaction.' 93 Such uses
of affirmative disclosure have been consistent with the nature of that
remedy—a conditional order prohibiting the respondent from continuing
its misleading advertising unless coupled with the required disclosure.
These functions, moreover, highlight an important distinction between the
FTC's traditional power to order affirmative disclosure and its newly-
established power to order corrective advertising. Affirmative disclosure
serves to correct deception flowing from misrepresentations expressly made
in the advertisements. Corrective advertising, on the other hand, serves to
In See Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18, 23 (5th Cir. 1960)
("There is nothing in the /liberty case that prevents enforcement of a cease and desist order
requiring affirmative disclosure. The Alberty case simply held that the Commission must make
certain findings before compelling affirmative disclosure."); Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC,
276 F.2d 952, 955 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960) ("In [Alberty) there were no find-
ings as here that failure to make any affirmative statement in itself was misleading."). In J.B.
Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884, 890-91 (6th Cir. 1971), the court used this rationale to
uphold the affirmative disclosure requirement struck down in Alberty.
1 °° Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 900-01 (9th Cir. 1960).
'°° 562 F.2d at 759 n.52.
'°' In L. Heller & Son, Inc. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1951), the respondent sold
imported imitation pearls without revealing the fact of foreign origin. Relying on evidence
which showed that the public preferred American-made products over imports, the Commis-
sion ruled this practice deceptive under section 5. The court sustained the Commission's order
that the respondent cease and desist selling the pearls without marks to disclose their foreign
origin. Id. at 955-56. Similarly, in Kerran v. FTC, 265 F.2d 246 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 818 (1959), the respondent sold re-refined oil in the same containers as those used to sell
oil refined from virgin crude. The Commission found this a deceptive practice under section 5
even though the two types of oil were the same quality and the respondent enjoyed no market
advantage due to the packaging. The court affirmed the order to cease and desist selling the
re-refined oil without a clear and conspicuous statement as to its origin on the container. The
court determined that the Commission could take action in response to consumer preference,
even if it was "predicated at least in part upon ill-founded sentiment, belief or caprice." Id. at
248.
'°' In Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942), the court sustained the Commis-
sion's order requiring the respondent to cease and desist from advertising that its product,
which contained dangerous drugs, was harmless or from failing to reveal the harmful effects
that might occur as a consequence of usage. Id. at 166, 170.
19 3
 In Portwood v. FTC, 418 F.2d 419 (10th Cir. 1969), the court affirmed a Commis-
sion order requiring a mail-order stamp business to include in its communications with cus-
tomers a statement regarding the legal rights of recipients of unsolicited merchandise received
through the mail. Id. at 423. Also, in All-State Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 423 F.2d 423 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970), the court sustained a Commission order requiring home-
improvement companies to reveal that instruments of indebtedness could be assigned to a fi-
nance company against whom the purchaser's claims or defenses would not be available. Id. at
425-26.
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prevent residual deception flowing from past misrepresentations, which de-
ception is encouraged and continued by future truthful advertisements.
BeCause corrective advertising thus mandates a disclosure even where the
future advertisements are not themselves misleading, it can be argued that
affirmative disclosure does not support corrective advertising.
B. A New Category?
Despite the fact that there are differences between affirmative disclo-
sures and corrective advertising, the court in Warner-Lambert nevertheless
viewed corrective advertising as a form of affirmative disclosure. After dis-
cussing the prior cases upholding affirmative disclosure orders, the court
identified another category where the remedy has been allowed: "Affirma-
tive disclosure has also been required when an advertisement, although not
misleading if taken alone, becomes misleading considered in light of past ad-
vertisements."'" By accepting this premise the court could conclude that
affirmative disclosure serves as precedent for corrective aiertising. To
support its proposition, the majority opinion relied primarily on two cases:
Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC' 95
 and Waltham Watch Co. v. FTC,'"
In Royal Baking, the respondent had sold for 60 years a cream of tar-
tar baking powder and had extensively advertised that it was superior to
the cheaper phosphate baking powders.t 9 ' However, after the company it-
self switched to phosphate, it continued to use labels and advertisements
substantially similar to those previously used. This helped to conceal or to
obscure the fact that the product changed.'" The FTC found this unfair
and deceptive in that consumers were deliberately misled into buying a
now-inferior product based upon the strength of a reputation that was no
longer true.'" Agreeing with the Commission, the Second Circuit affirmed
an order requiring the respondent to change its labelling and advertising
format, to substitute the word "phosphate" for the word "cream" in its
labels and advertisements and to cease representing that the new product
was the same as had been sold for years. 20 °
In Waltham Watch, the respondent company was organized as a spin-
off of the original, famous 100 year-old Massachusetts clock company. The
respondent licensed another company to use the original name in connec-
tion with the sale of clocks imported from Europe. 20 ' Similar to those ad-
vertisements in Royal Baking, the advertisements in Waltham Watch stressed
the history of quality of the original company and misrepresented that the
clocks were manufactured by that company."' The Seventh Circuit upheld
the FTC's order that the respondent cease and desist from permitting the
use of the name "Waltham" unless accompanied by a statement that the
clocks were not manufactured by•the original Massachusetts company.'"
'" 562 F.2d at 760 (emphasis added).
195
 281 F. 744 (2d Cir. 1922).
' 9° 318 F.2d 28 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 944 (1963).
197 281 F. at 747.
198 281 F. at 747-49.
199 Id. at 749-50.
no Id. at 750, 753.
29 ' 318 F.2d at 29-30.
202 1d. at 30-31.
202 1d. at 31-32.
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In Warner-Lambert, the majority concluded that the affirmative disclo-
sure remedies authorized in Royal Baking and Waltham Watch were the same
as the corrective advertising order now sought by the Commission:
Like Royal and Waltham, Listerine has built up over a period of
many years a widespread reputation. When it was ascertained
that that reputation no longer applied to the product, it was
necessary to take action to correct it. Here, as in Royal and
Waltham, it is the accumulated impact of past advertising that
necessitates disclosure in future advertising. To allow consumers
to continue to buy the product on the strength of the impression
built up by prior advertising—an impression which is not known
to be false—would be unfair and deceptive.'"
The court's determination that the remedies affirmed in Royal Baking and
Waltham Watch were comparable to the corrective advertising order at
issue in Warner-Lambert rested on its assertion that the Royal and Waltham
advertisements were truthful, but became deceptive in the context of the
past advertising. 205
 In the same manner, the court reasoned that the Lis-
terine advertisements will be truthful after a cease and desist order but be-
came deceptive in the context of the prior cold and sore throat claims.
While this view has some force, the cases can be distinguished. The
advertisements in Royal Baking and Waltham Watch cannot be considered
"truthful" unless the concept is stretched. In both cases, the advertisements
before the court were found to demonstrate a substantial and willing con-
cealment of the fact that the product had changed. In Royal, the respon-
dent retained the same advertisements and labels, the same trademark, and
stressed its history of quality. In Waltham Watch the respondent repeatedly
emphasized its name and the quality and dependability of that name, delib-
erately conveying the impression that the imported clocks were manufac-
tured by the famous American company. As recognized by the Warner-
Lambert dissent:
In those cases advertisements falsely represented that the prod-
ucts offered for sale were the same as the products, well-known
to the public, which had been offered in the past. The Commis-
sion's orders simply required these false representations to be
corrected in future advertisements using the same or similar
format or copy. 205
In contrast, after compliance with a simple cease and desist order, the fu-
ture Listerine advertisements will be "truthful" since there will no longer be
any cold and sore throat claims. Because the remedies authorized in Royal
Baking and Waltham Watch can be distinguished from the corrective adver-
20 ' 562 F.2d at 761.
205 Id. at 760 n.57. The Warner-Lambert court noted that in Royal and Waltham, the ad-
vertisements were once true, but were no longer so due to a change in the product. In
Warner-Lambert, the product has remained the same but it is now known that the advertise-
ments were never true. The court found that nevertheless, the result is the same: "like Royal
baking powder or Waltham watches, Listerine continues to enjoy a reputation it does not de-
serve, and consumers would therelbre be deceived if they were to make purchases in reliance
upon that reputation."Id. at 761 n,58.
2 ° 6 1d. at 768 (Robb, J., dissenting).
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tising order in Warner-Lambert, the court's assertion that corrective advertis-
ing is another category of affirmative disclosure is open to question.
Corrective advertising should be viewed as an innovative technique
rather than as another form of affirmative disclosure. This fact, however,
does not put it beyond the scope of the FTC's power. Affirmative disclo-
sure forbids an advertiser from making future representations which are
deceptive unless he discloses information which negates the deception. Cor-
rective advertising, on the other hand, requires a disclosure even if the fu-
ture advertisements make no reference to the prior claims, because it is de-
signed to dissipate the lingering effects of past deception. However, this
distinction between affirmative disclosure and corrective advertising should
not be given controlling weight. If in fact the future honest advertisements
build on the latent impressions left in the consumer's mind by the prior
advertisements, then the Commission should have the authority to
counteract the effect of these "implied" representations. Whether public
deception flows from misrepresentations made in the advertisements them-
selves or from the, lingering effects of past misrepresentations should not
alter the nature of the Commission's remedial power. Thus, although the
affirmative disclosure cases do not squarely support the order imposed in
Warner-Lambert, corrective advertising can be viewed as the logical extension
of these precedents.
C. The Need for Corrective Advertising
The idea that corrective advertising is valid as a logical extension of
the Commission's affirmative disclosure power can be supported for a
number of reasons. Affirmative disclosure has been judicially sanctioned
when necessary to deal effectively with the form of deception found by the
Commission. The same reasoning supports the necessity of corrective ad-
vertising since a Commission order which requires the respondent merely
to cease making the false claims is ineffective due to the failure to rebut the
effects of the prior advertisements. Viewed in this light, the corrective ad-
vertising order is essential to the Commission's ability to carry out its
statutory mandate. The wide latitude given by the courts to the Commis-
sion to fashion remedies 207 is further support for the agency's authority to
combat residual deception. If traditional cease and desist orders are inef-
fective to accomplish this task, then corrective advertising becomes appro-
priate. "If the Commission is to attain the objectives Congress envisioned, it
cannot be required to confine its road block to the narrow lane the trans-
gressor has traveled, it must be allowed effectively to close all roads to the
prohibited goal, so that its order may not be by-passed with impunity." 208
Similarly, the fact that future advertisements will be truthful should
not be an obstacle to the imposition of corrective advertising, for the
Commission cannot presume that the new advertisements alone will dissi-
pate the lingering beliefs. While a few sophisticated consumers might rec-
ognize the significance of altered advertising, the general public would re-
' 1" A considerable degree of discretion is given to the Commission not only to define
what is unfair or deceptive but also to determine the proper remedy that will pin a stop to
such practices. See text at notes 71-75 supra.
2 FTC v, Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470;473 (1952), quoted in Warner-Lambert, 562 F.2d
at 759-60.
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member and continue to believe the prior claims. And it is this latter body
that the Commission is intended to protect. 209
 Thus, the Commission can-
not be bound by literal truth if a false impression is conveyed to the gen-
eral public because of the past representations:
If the Commission, having discretion to deal with these matters,
thinks it best to insist upon a form of advertising clear enough so
that, in the words of the prophet Isaiah, 'wayfaring men, though
fools, shall not err therein,' it is not for the'courts to revise its
judgment. Advertisements are intended not `to be carefully dis-
sected with a dictionary at hand, but rather to produce an im-
pression upon' prospective purchasers. 21 °
The need for corrective advertising is highlighted by the delay atten-
dant upon FTC proceedings. 2 " It is a common occurrence that years pass
from the time a deceptive advertisement is used until the time the Commis-
sion discovers it, begins proceedings, issues a cease and desist order and
has that order judicially sustained. 212
 Significantly, the court in Warner-
Lambert noted that the nature of this problem further emphasized the inef-
fectiveness of the traditional cease and desist order:
While we do not know and do not decide whether [Warner-
Lambert] made its false cold claims in good faith or bad, we do
observe that for an advertiser who knowingly advertises falsely a
simple cease and desist order provides no real deterrent. He has
nothing to lose but attorneys' fees. He gets to use the deceptive
advertisements until he is caught—more precisely, until Commis-
sion proceedings, which usually drag on for years, are completed
against him. By the time the order has become final, the particu-
lar campaign has probably been squeezed dry, if not already dis-
5" See Charles of the Ritz Dist. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 677 (2d Cir. 1944). See also
Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942).
	 •
11°
 Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942), quoting Newton Tea & Spice
Co. v. United States, 288 F. 475, 479 (fith Cir. 1923).
'" For a discussion of this problem, see Note, "Corrective Advertising" Orders of the Federal
Trade Commission, 85 HARV. L. REV. 477, 482-88 (1971).
m See H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1974) U.S. CODE CONG.
Sc An. NEws 7702,7714.
Some cases have taken years from the filing of the original complaint to a cease
and desist order becoming final. In this regard the report of a special commis-
sion of the American Bar Association established to study the FTC stated: 'Prob-
lems of delay have vexed the FTC ever since it was established, and some of the
most notorious examples of protracted administrative proceedings have occurred
in that agency. One consequence of such delay was illustrated recently in Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FTC, in which a Court of Appeals, reviewing in
1969 an FTC cease and desist order entered in 1967 under Section 5, found that
evidence of injury to competition has been based on a 1959 investigation. The
Court concluded that market conditions had changed so substantially in the in-
tervening years that the FTC's findings were no longer reliable, and it remanded
the case for the taking of additional evidence on the question of injury.'
Id. (quoting REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Sep-
tember 15, 1969).
In Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884
(1959), it took the Commission sixteen years to require the respondent to cease and desist
from making misleading advertising claims with regard to its laxative pills. A more typical ex-
ample is Warner-Lambert itself, which officially began in 1971.
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carded. In the meantime the seller has increased his market
share and reaped handsome profits. The order to cease making
the false claims takes none of this away from him. In short, la]
cease and desist order which commands the respondent only to
"go, and sin no more" simply allows every violator a free bite at
the apple.'213
Corrective advertising is an effective remedy for this problem. The incen-
tive for a business to engage in misleading advertising would likely be re-
duced since the profits attributable to the campaign would be offset by the
costs of compliance with the order. In addition, the advertiser's credibility
would be called into question by the imposed honesty of a corrective state-
ment.
The Warner-Lambert court found' precedent for corrective advertising
by positing it as another category of the Commission's power to order af-
firmative disclosure. As demonstrated, this conclusion is questionable and
corrective advertising should more properly be viewed as a logical exten-
sion of affirmative disclosure. Corrective advertising serves the same pur-
pose in cases of residual deception that affirmative disclosure serves in
cases of express deception. The point is further supported by the fact that
the innovative remedy of corrective advertising is needed to deal with the
unique problem of lingering deception since mere cessation of the false ad-
vertisements is not adequate. 'Therefore, although the court's holding in
Warner-Lambert stretches the Commission's discretionary authority, it is
submitted that this approach is necessary if the Commission is to carry out
effectively it statutory powers.
IV. THE GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE USE
OF CORRECTIVE ADVERTISING
Judicial recognition of the Commission's authority to order corrective
advertising does not decide the question whether it is a proper .remedy in
every case in which a traditional cease and desist order would issue and re-
sidual deception is demonstrated. While the proper application of the cor-
rective advertising remedy will be decided by future litigation, Warner-
Lambert has provided some guidelines as to when the remedy will be im-
posed. In its discussion of the Listerine order, the court focused on the cir-
cumstances under which corrective advertising may be appropriate. In ad-
dition, its treatment of the order suggests future limits that may be placed
on the content and other terms of the corrective message itself.
A. Appropriate Circumstances for the Imposition of
Corrective Advertising
Consistent with the Commission's specialization and expertise in the
field, courts have traditionally recognized its authority to determine the
meaning of an advertisement and whether or not that meaning has the
tendency or capacity to deceive the public. 214 The Commission's determina-
tions in this respect have been deemed findings of fact which would be up-
"3 562 F.2d at 761-62 n.60 (quoting Note, supra note 211, at 482.83).
214 See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 29, 31 (7th Cir. 1944).
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held unless the court found them to be arbitrary or clearly wrong. 2 "
Moreover, the finding of a tendency to deceive is sufficient to support a
cease and desist order, and the Commission is not required to prove an
actual deceptive effect. 2 " In addition, the Commission is allowed to infer
that the presumed deception will be a material factor in the consumer pur-
chasing decision. 21 " Finally, the courts have used a lax standard in review-
ing FTC remedies, characterized by the view that the Commission's order
need have only a "reasonable relation" to the violation sought to be rem-
edied. 218
However, this note has suggested that corrective advertising should
properly be viewed as something more than a simple cease and desist or-
der. By requiring the respondent to insert a prescribed and presumably
detrimental corrective message, the Commission's remedy raises concern
regarding first amendment protection of commercial speech.'" Although
the Warner-Lambert court held corrective advertising not unconstitutional 2 20
it recognized that the question "triggers a special responsibility on the
Commission to order corrective advertising only if the restriction inherent
in its order is no greater than necessary to serve the interest involved. "221
The constitutional problem involved in the imposition of a corrective mes-
sage is thus important since it dictates a departure from the "reasonable re-
lation" standard employed to review an ordinary cease and desist order.
Indeed, the very nature of corrective advertising supports such a depar-
ture. The foundation of the remedy is that the lingering deception is so ef-
fective that it influences consumer behavior even after the false repre-
sentations have been stopped. Thus, before imposing corrective advertising,
the Commission should be required to go beyond proving that an adver-
tisement has the tendency to deceive and should have to show that there
has been substantial actual deception which will continue to influence the
consuming public's purchasing decisions.
In formulating its own guidelines as to when corrective advertising is
to be imposed, the Commission has acknowledged that a more stringent
burden of proof is appropriate:
[I]f a deceptive advertisement has played a substantial role in
creating or reinforcing in the public's mind a false and material
belief which lives on after the false advertisement ceases, there is clear
and continuing injury to competition and to the consuming pub-
lic as consumers continue to make purchasing decisions based on
the false belief. Since this injury cannot be averted by merely re-
15 Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461, 496 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884
(1959).
816 Charles of the Ritz Dist. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944). This stan-
dard is applicable even where the Commission requires the advertiser to engage in affirmative
disclosure. Portwood v. FTC, 418 F.2d 419, 421-22 (10th Cir. 1969); Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d
879, 883-84 (9th Cir. 1960).
2 " FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391-92 (1965).
6 " The leading case enunciating this standard of deference to the Commission's broad
discretion and expertise is Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946). See text at notes
74-75 supra. This standard has been applied unanimously by later courts. See, e.g., FTC v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 392 (1965); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473
(1952).
210
 See text at notes 149.71 supra.
880 562 F.2d at 758-59, 768-72.
III Id. at 758 (emphasis added).
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quiring respondent to cease dissemin'ating the advertisement, we
may appropriately order respondent to take affirmative action
designed to terminate the otherwise continuing ill effects of the
advertisements."'
In approving this standard, the Warner
-Lambert court noted that the stan-
dard requires the Commission to prove that the false advertisements played
a substantial role in causing an erroneous consumer belief and that the be-
lief did not dissipate after the advertisements were stopped.'"
Based on the record before it, the Warner-Lambert court held that the
Commission met its burden of proof on these prerequisites. 224
 In its opin-
ion below, the agency had analyzed the voluminous evidence produced at
the administrative proceedings to conclude that Listerine's prior deceptive
advertisements had engendered false beliefs which would live on after the
advertisements were stopped. On review, the court found persuasive the
Commission's use of scientific consumer survey evidence and the testimony
of experts. Indeed, the survey evidence, known as the "Product Q" reports,
was Warner-Lambert's own consumer surveys designed to show the effec-
tiveness of its advertising. 225
 The court concluded that this evidence consti-
tuted "substantial evidence in support of the need for corrective advertising
in this case. "226
The adoption of the corrective advertising remedy in the Warner-
Lambert case does not necessarily herald widespread imposition of this rem-
edy. The circumstances of the Listerine advertising campaign were pecu-
liarly suited to the assembling of evidence sufficient to justify the require-
ment of corrective advertising in that case. The campaign was a nationwide
project continued for a sustained period of time. It encompassed all major
forms of media and was unique in that no other mouthwash product
claimed effectiveness in the treatment of colds and sore throats. Thus, it
was easier for the Commission to prove its case than in other less widely
known or publicized advertising campaigns.'" It may be extremely difficult
for the Commission to show that a lingering false belief originated from a
particular advertisement for a certain product in cases where other adver-
tisements for comparable products make the same or similar claims.
Moreover, the Commission may not have the resources to investigate,
222 Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1499-1500 (1975), [1973-1976 Transfer Bind-
er] TRADE Ran. REP. (CCH) 4 21,066, at 20,934-35 (emphasis added).
223 562 F.2d at 762.
224 Id. at 762-63.
213 Id. at 762 n.65. The "Product Q" reports showed that about 70% of those surveyed
recalled the cold and sore throat claims as a major part or Listerine's advertising; the figure
fell to only 64% after the claims were stopped for a period of six months. In addition, 60% of
those surveyed actually believed that Listerine was effective in fighting colds and sore throats.
The testimony of the survey experts corroborated these results. Id.
226
 Id. at 762-63.
" 7
 Noting the unique nature of the Listerine advertising campaign and the substantial
evidence supporting the Commission's claims, Professor Pitofsky has stated that "[c]omparable
proof of deception-perception-memory influence would be virtually impossible in most adver-
tising cases. If the Commission is to do an effective job in regulating deceptive advertising,
corrective advertising must apply to more than the one-in-a-million type of ad campaign pre-
sent in Warner-Lambert." Pitofsky, supra note 105, at 697-98.
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gather evidence and prove its case whenever there is a need for corrective
advertising. 228 In short, the burden of proof required of the Commission
by the stricter standard—proof that a corrective advertising order is neces-
sary to eradicate deception rather than that it is only "reasonably related"
to such purpose—may limit the future application of the corrective adver-
tising remedy to advertising campaigns similar to the one employed by
Warner-Lambert. Nevertheless, because of the first amendment consid-
erations and the extraordinary nature of the remedy, the Commission
should be required to meet the stricter standard before it can order correc-
tive advertising.
In Warner-Lambert, there is language intimating that it may be proper
in some situations to relax this standard in favor of an approach that re-
quires the advertiser to prove that corrective advertising is not needed. 229
Observing that the very purpose of expensive advertising investments is to
produce a lasting effect on consumer purchasing habits, the court stated
that "it might be appropriate in some cases to presume the existence of the
two factual predicates [that the advertisements have promoted a false belief
and that this belief will linger on] for corrective advertising."230 Although
the court did not state under what circumstances use of the presumption
would be appropriate, its language suggests that such use would occur in
cases involving massive advertising campaigns, similar to the Listerine cam-
paign.
The effect of the presumption would be to shift the burden of proof
in much the same manner as is done in reviewing traditional cease and de-
sist orders. Applying such a presumption, a corrective advertising order
could be imposed after the Commission made an initial showing that the
advertisements in question had the capacity or tendency to deceive unless
the respondent rebutted the presumption.by demonstrating that there was
no actual deception. Likewise, once the tendency to deceive or actual de-
ception was established, the lingering nature of the deception would be
presumed unless the respondent introduced evidence disproving the re-
sidual effects. Rebutting the presumption could very well prove an ex-
tremely difficult task for it would require the respondent to show that its
advertising was not really effective. The respondent would be required, in
effect, to show that consumers did not believe the advertisements or, if they
did, that the advertisements had no lasting effects upon them. In such a
case, the burden on the advertiser to demonstrate the absence of any de-
ceptive effect would be at least as great as the burden to show actual decep-
tion which is presently imposed on the Commission by the stricter stan-
dard. The use of such a presumption by future courts would mean that
corrective advertising orders would probably be given the same deference
by the courts that has been traditionally given to simple cease and desist
orders.
"" The "Product Q" reports, upon which the Commission and the court primarily re-
lied, cost Warner-Lambert over $100,000. 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1501, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 21,066, at 20,935. The Commission is not likely to be able to meet
the expense concomitant with years of proceedings for every casein which a corrective adver-
tising order may be effective. It stands to reason that only "major" campaigns would be af-
forded such treatment.
226 562 F.2d at 762.
2" Id.
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The Warner-Lambert court, however, found it unnecessary to use the
presumption in affirming the Commission's order because of the presence
of the survey evidence and expert testimony. 23 ' Thus, while mentioning it
as a possibility, the court based its decision on the more stringent "neces-
sary" standard. Whether or not the presumption is employed, the correc-
tive advertising remedy seems more appropriate to remedy deceptions oc-
curring in the larger, "major" advertising campaigns. 232 The expenditure
and exposure associated with these campaigns would increase the difficulty
of negating their effects. Correspondingly, in less intensive or less pub-
licized campaigns, the respondent would seem to be in a better position to
prevail against the Commission. In such cases, there is a greater likelihood
that the advertising did not achieve its intended effect. This may be due to
a number of factors, such as the infrequency of exposure to the consumer
and the smaller number of consumers actually reached by the advertise-
ments. In addition, the applicability of corrective advertising would depend
upon the length of time that the false or deceptive claims were advertised.
The longer the advertising was disseminated, the greater the likelihood that
it had a substantial lasting effect. While these factors indicate that correc-
tive advertising will be employed in cases involving major advertising cam-
paigns similar to the Listerine campaign, it is possible that misleading cam-
paigns made for a short period of time or addressed to a smaller number'
of consumers could demonstrate the requisite degree of residual deception
to render corrective advertising appropriate. In such cases, whether a court
uses the stricter standard actually followed by the court in Warner-Lambert
or a laxer standard based upon a presumption could be an important de-
terminant in a decision on the efficacy of a particular corrective advertising
order. Nevertheless, the Commission should be held to the stricter stan-
dard, which requires it to show that the order is necessary to correct what-
ever residual deception is found to exist.
B. Terms and Content of the Corrective Advertising Order
Although it employed a "necessary" standard for determining the ap-
propriateness of the corrective advertising order, the Warner-Lambert court
stated that the limited "reasonable relation" standard was applicable when
reviewing the terms of the order such as the amount of money required to
be spent on the corrective campaign. Nevertheless, while the court applied
the "reasonable relation" standard to its review of the terms, it applied the
stricter "necessary" standard to its review of the content of the message it-
self. With regard to the terms of the order, the Commission had required
the message for the next $10 million worth of Listerine advertising, a fig-
ure equivalent to the average annual Listerine advertising budget for the
period April, 1962 to March, 1972. 233 The duration requirement was tied
to the expenditures so that Warner-Lambert could not evade the order
simply by not advertising for a period of time. The court found this to be
"reasonably related to the violation [the Commission] found." 234
t" hi. at 762-63.
232 Given the limited resources of the Commission, it may wish, as a matter of policy, to
impose the remedy only in those cases where the advertising campaigns have been wide-
spread.
"3 See text at note 11 supra.
234 562 F.2d at 763-64.
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On the other hand, the court viewed the content of the message
proposed by the Commission—"Contrary to prior advertising, Listerine will
not help prevent colds or sore throats or lessen their severity"—in a differ-
ent light. Since the goat of the order was to have the corrective message
reach the public in a meaningful way so that residual deception could be
eradicated, it would appear that this message was "reasonably related" to
that goal. However, the court declared: "[W]e believe the preamble 'con-
trary to prior advertising' is not necessary." 235 The court determined that
the function of the preamble in calling attention to the corrective message
was not persuasive evidence in favor of its retention because that purpose
was served by other terms in the order. 236 While this finding may be accu-
rate, it is not consistent with the "reasonable relation" standard since the
mere fact that two portions of the order serve the same purpose does not
necessitate the elimination of one. Thus, it would appear that the "neces-
sary" standard in fact guided the court's review of the content of the cor-
rective message itself.
The reason for the approach taken in Warner-Lambert lies in a combi-
nation of factors. Besides the first amendment considerations, 237 the court
was influenced by the fact that the "confessional preamble" would have the
tendency "to humiliate the advertiser."'" Intentional humiliation may be
outside the Commission's authority under section 5 since the FTC does not
have the power to punish a wrongdoer. 235
 Nevertheless, it is not clear
whether a judicially-imposed "Scarlet letter" should be labelled punitive. In
general, administrative orders requiring confessional disclosures have been
given varying treatment by the courts. The orders of the National Labor
Relations Board serve as useful illustrations of this treatment.
Like the FTC, the NLRB is empowered to prevent certain unfair
practices through cease and desist orders. 24° In addition, it can order cer-
tain affirmative action, such as reinstatement of employees, to effectuate
235 Id. at 763 (emphasis added).
230 1d. The court noted that
in printed advertisements [the corrective message) must be displayed in type size
at least as large as that in which the principal portion of the text of the adver-
tisement appears and it must be separated from the text so that it can be easily
noticed. In television commercials the disclosure must be presented simulta-
neously in both audio and visual portions. During the audio portion of the dis-
closure in television and radio advertisements, no other sounds, including music,
may occur.
These specifications are well calculated to assure that the disclosure will
reach the public.
Id. In support of its conclusion, the court cited United States v. National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs, 555 F.2d 978, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1977), and Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 618-19
(3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977), as requiring that an "order should not be
more intrusive than necessary to achieve.fulfillinent of the governmental interest." 562 F.2d at
763 n.68.
232 First amendment considerations would appear to be a stronger force with respect to
a confessional preamble than with a corrective message in general. By expressly calling atten-
tion to the past deception, the former places a greater burden on the constitutionally pro-
tected right to advertise. Similarly, it can be argued that the use of such a preamble is not the
least restrictive means of achieving the government's purpose of providing truthful informa-
tion to consumers since other terms in a corrective advertising order serve the same function.
230 562 F.2d at 763.
239 See text at notes 61-64 & 1 l I supra.
240 29 U.S.C.	 160(c) (1970).
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the statutory policies. 2 "t Recognizing the NLRB's expertise in the labor
field, the courts have given it broad discretion in formulating remedies, 242
but, like the FTC, it does not have the power to punish past wrongs. 243 In
the past, the Board has attempted to impose a form of corrective, remedy
where it has found the employer guilty of unfair labor practices. As part of
the cease and desist order, it has required the employer to read the terms
of the order aloud to the employees at a meeting called for that purpose.
Provisions of this kind have been viewed as forms of punishment beyond
the Board's statutory authority and have been struck down as unnecessarily
embarrassing and humiliating to management."' Some courts, on the other
hand, have modified the orders to give the company the option of having
the notice read by NLRB representatives, rather than by its own officials.
In this manner, the element of humiliation is mitigated somewhat and the
order has been held not to be penal in nature. 245 At the same time, how-
ever, the remedy has been limited to undoing the effect of egregious unfair
labor practices. 24 °
The FTC's corrective advertising remedy is analogous to the NLRB's
remedy in that it requires the respondent to disclose publicly his previous
violation. Because of the punitive implications, orders for such disclosure
should be subjected to closer judicial scrutiny to avoid unnecessary humilia-
tion. Thus, the Warner-Lambert court applied a test focusing upon whether
the proposed corrective message was reasonably necessary to achieve the
goal of the FTC's order—effective communication of the truth and elimi-
nation of residual deception. The application of this test in Warner-Lambert
indicates that a preamble having the tendency to humiliate will be treated
much like the NLRB's disclosure requirements, and will be either struck
down as punitive or affirmed with modification to remove the element of
humiliation. The Warner-Lambert court expressly declined to comment on
whether intended humiliation always would constitute unauthorized
punishment but hinted that intended humiliation "might be called for in an
egregious case of deliberate deception."247 The court determined that this
was not such a case since "the record compiled could support a finding of
good faith."'" Thus, it appears that this type of message, like the NLRB's
941 Id .
212
	 e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610.15 (1969); Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215-16 (1964); NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344
U.S. 344, 348-49 (1953); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943);
Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 46 (1942); International Ass'n of Machinists v.
NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 82 (1940).
"" See, e.g., NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357, 359 (1969); Local 60, United Mid. of Car-
penters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961); NLRB v, Gullets Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 362
(1951); NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241, 250 (1939).
444 See NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 369 F.2d 859, 869 (5th Cir.
1966). The same result was reached in International Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB,
383 F.2(1 230 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the court stating; "The ignominy of a forced public reading
and a 'confession of sins' by any employer, any employee, or any union representative makes
such a remedy incompatible with the democratic principles of the dignity of man." id. at 234.
9A6 e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 292, 304-05 (2d Cir. 1967); Textile
Workers Union v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 896, 903-05 (2d Cir. 1967); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB,
461 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1972). Cf. NLRB v. Bush Hog, Inc., 405 F.2d 755, 758-59 (5th Cir.
1968).
" 6 See Lipman Motors, Inc. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 197 1).
2" 562 F.2d at 763.
2" Id.
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disclosure requirement, will be used only when needed to restore the bal-
ance after an extreme violation.
Although the Warner-Lambert court paid lipservice to the "reasonable
relation" standard used by courts to review traditional cease and desist or-
ders, it actually applied the more stringent "necessary" standard because of
the first amendment considerations inherent in the imposed message. This
approach is justified because the fundamental rationale for corrective ad-
vertising is the retention by the public of erroneous beliefs after the decep-
tive advertising has ceased. It is logical to require the Commission to show
this substantial actual deception before imposing the remedy. The court
also applied the same standard when reviewing the content of the message
itself and its treatment of the "confessional preamble" indicates that the
content of future messages will hinge on factual circumstances. Future im-
position of the remedy will be decided on a case-by-case basis, but its use
would seem to be limited to "major" advertising campaigns, similar to the
one employed by Warner-Lambert.
CONCLUSION
In holding that the Federal Trade Commission has the authority to
order mandatory corrective advertising, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia has looked beyond the literal language of sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Because of the due process
problem inherent in that'section's language, the Commission has been lim-
ited to prohibiting for the future those business practices that it finds un-
fair or deceptive. However, the Commission has in the past been allowed to
require the 'wrongdoer to take some affirmative action to correct antitrust
violations and it seems logical to extend this power to advertising violations.
Corrective advertising is a permissible affirmative remedy under section 5
since it serves to prevent future deception in the form of lingering errone-
ous beliefs in the public mind engendered by past false advertising. Since
the remedy requires disclosure in literally truthful advertisements, it should
not be viewed as a category of the Commission's power to order affirmative
disclosure but rather as a logical extension of that power. Such extension is
made necessary by the fact that traditional cease and desist orders cannot
deal adequately with the problem of residual deception. Although correc-
tive advertising will be subjected to a closer judicial scrutiny than that given
simple cease and desist orders in the past, the Warner-Lambert case estab-
lishes corrective advertising as an important new weapon for both the Fed-
eral Trade Commission and the consumer.
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